The clash between Abu-1 and Abu-2 – Abu-Amar v. Abu-Mazen – is not a personal matter, as it ispresented by journalists in Israel and all over the world. Of course, the egos of the twopersonalities do play a role, as in all political fights. But the controversy itself goes muchdeeper. It reflects the unique situation of the Palestinian people.
An upper-class Palestinian defined it this week on Israeli television as “the move from theculture of revolution to the culture of a state.” Meaning: the Palestinian war of liberationhas come to an end, and now the time has come to put the affairs of state in order. Therefore,Yasser Arafat (Abu-Amar), who represents the first, must go and Mahmud Abbas (Abu-Mazen),who represents the second, must take over.
No description could be further from reality. The Palestinian war of liberation is now at itsheight. Perhaps it has never been at a more critical stage. The Palestinians are faced withexistential threats: ethnic cleansing (called in Israel “transfer”) or imprisonment inpowerless, Bantustan-style enclaves.
How has this illusion – that the national struggle is over and that the time has come to turn toadministrative matters – arisen?
The situation of the Palestinian people is indeed unique. As far as I am aware, it has noparallel in history. Following the Oslo agreements, a kind of Palestinian mini-state cameinto being, consisting of several small enclaves on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Theseenclaves have to be administered. But the national Palestinian aim – a viable, independentstate in all the West Bank and Gaza Strip, including East Jerusalem – is far from beingattained. In order to achieve it, an arduous national struggle lies ahead.
Thus, two different – and contradictory – structures exist side by side: a nationalliberation movement requiring strong and authoritative leadership, and a mini-state thatneeds a regular, democratic and transparent administration.
Arafat represents the first. He is much more than a “symbol”, as he is often described. He is aleader possessing an unequalled moral authority among his own people and vast experience ininternational affairs. He has steered the Palestinian national movement away fromsubjugation to Arab and international interests and led it from near oblivion to thethreshold of independence.
Abu-Mazen and his colleagues represent the second reality. They have no solid base amongtheir own people, but do have connections with powerful players, most importantly the UnitedStates and Israel, with all that entails.
The debate between the two hinges on an assessment of the intifada . For two and a half years, thePalestinian people have been suffering immense losses: about 2500 people killed, tenthousand disabled and injured, a whole stratum of young leaders wiped out, the economydestroyed, immense damage to property. Was this worthwhile? Can it continue?
Abu-Mazen and his supporters say No. They believe that the whole fight was a mistake. Evenbefore the present debate, Abu-Mazen called for the cessation of the “armed intifada “. Hebelieves that the Palestinians can achieve more in negotiations with the US and in a politicalprocess with Israel. He relies on the mainstream Israeli peace movement and personalitieslike ex-Labor minister Yossi Beilin. In his opinion, the violence undermines the politicalprocess and harms the Palestinian people.
Abu-Mazen’s opponents deny all this. In their opinion, not only has the intifada not failed,but, quite the contrary, has had important results: the Israeli economy is in deep crisis, thetensions in Israeli society have reached a peak, Israel’s image in the world has sunk from ademocracy defending itself to a ruthless occupier. Security has worsened to the point thatthere are armed security guards everywhere. The casualties seem to them a price worth paying.If the war of attrition continues, they believe, Israeli will in the end be compelled to accedeto the minimum demands of the Palestinians (a state, the Green Line border, Jerusalem as ashared capital, dismantling the settlements and a negotiated solution of the refugeequestion.)
Moreover, Abu-Mazen’s opponents believe that his basic assumptions are wrong. The US willnever pressure Israel, whose agents control Washington. Israel will never concede anythingwithout being forced to do so. Sharon will continue building settlements, creating facts onthe ground and pulling the land out from under the feet of the Palestinian people even whilepretending to conduct negotiations.
Abu-Mazens position may, perhaps, have been stronger if the US and Israel had not been soobviously trying to impose him on the Palestinian people. The examples of poor Karzai inAfghanistan and the miserable gang of emigres whom the Americans brought to Iraq arecertainly not helping Abu-Mazen, despite his being one of the founders of the Fatah movement.
A large group of mediators have tried to achieve a compromise. They say, in effect, that thereis an ideal division of labor: Arafat will continue to lead the struggle for liberation,Abu-Mazen will administer the Palestinian enclaves.
However, this raises many practical problems. For example: where will the money for theliberation struggle come from? What will happen to the armed organizations, and who willcontrol the security forces? Who will possess the supreme authority – the Palestinian peopleas a whole, including the Diaspora (Arafat as Chairman of the PLO) or the administration of theenclaves (Abu-Mazen)?
And, most important of all: would Abu-Mazen be prepared to risk a fratricidal war? The US andIsrael demand that he liquidate the armed organizations and confiscate their weapons, evenbefore the Palestinians move one step towards a state of their own. This will, of course,involve a bloody internecine struggle that will fill Sharon’s government with joy andconsolidate its position still further. Or should national unity be maintained, at leastuntil Israel stops all settlement activity and agrees to a Palestinian state in all theoccupied territories?
This debate is much wider than the personal struggle between Abu and Abu, ego against ego. Forthe Palestinian people, this is a debate about existential questions – just like similardebates in the Jewish community in Palestine, that ended only with the founding of the State ofIsrael.