You can’t understand Ehud Barak without knowing where he came from: the “General Staffcommando unit”.
The commando unit is not an army unit like any other. It is a frame of mind, a disposition, a way oflooking at the world.
During the 1948 war I served in Samson’s Foxes company which was, together with the NegevAnimals, the mother of all Israeli army commando units. I know what I am talking about, becauseat the time I became infected with some of these traits myself. It wasn’t easy to get rid of them.
The commando is a “select” unit and its members are very aware of this. In order to prepare themfor especially dangerous missions, they are instilled with the belief that they are the best,the most courageous; each one special. They are imbued with contempt for all other soldiers.”It’s us and nobody else.”
This feeling of superiority brings with it a contempt for law and order. A commando will not becaught properly dressed, he will always take care to look a bit disheveled. Rules which applyto ordinary soldiers – the chain of command, outward (as distinct from “inner”) discipline,parade-ground drill and other such “bullshit” – are not for him. The word bullshit is used inits original version, as is the word “bardak”, meaning bordello – a general state of blesseddisorder.
Daring, initiative and resourcefulness are essential commando attributes, as is the otherside of the coin – arrogance and smugness.
More important than these personal traits are the operational ones. The commando exists forspecial operations, often behind enemy lines. Therefore, the commando operates in smallunits able to move quickly, to surprise the enemy from an unexpected direction, to achieve theobjective and get out. The commando is not designed to hold on to a conquered position, butrather to clear out quickly, before the opponent has time to counterattack. To kill, toconfirm the killing, to scram.
The term “commando”, in this sense, is derived from the Dutch. It originated at the time of theBoer Wars (Boer is Dutch for farmer) when the regular British army fought against the Dutchsettlers in South Africa, who formed small local militias and called them “commandos”. Thesewere extremely mobile units, they knew the countryside well and were able to surprise thecumbersome British battalions.
The British learned their lesson and in World War II they set up their own commandos. Jews fromPalestine (my brother among them fought in one of them, the Middle East Commando. Thecommandos were employed in hit-and-run operations, which were not uniformly successful.
The way of thinking of a commando chief (like Ariel Sharon, chief of Unit 101) is quitedifferent from that of a general commanding a mass of armor and infantry (like Israel Tal, thetank expert). The general has to move large forces, coordinate between commanders with hugeegos, safeguard occupied territory, plan supplies and keep allies in line. His perceptionsof space, time and forces are quite alien to a commando chief. A commando, on the other hand, hasno strategic perception, he deals only with short-term tactics. Barak, for example. put onwomen’s clothes, landed in Beirut, killed Palestinian leaders and got out. On anotheroccasion, he donned white overalls, entered the Sabena airplane (at Tel Aviv airport),killed the kidnappers. Finis.
Therefore, it is nearly impossible for a commando officer to become the chief-of-staff in anormal army. But in Israel, the opposite is true: Nearly all recent chiefs-of-staff have comefrom the commandos. In the political arena, the situation is even stranger: In no otherWestern democracy are there so many generals in the Government and in other senior positions.In Israel, the last two Prime Ministers were former commando officers.
Barak conducts a commando policy. On the positive side, he has a lot of daring, originality andresourcefulness. On the negative side, he has a lot of arrogance and pomposity that tells himthat he knows everything better than anybody else, an abysmal contempt for his colleagues andan inability to set up an orderly administration, to coordinate between colleagues and todelegate responsibility. All these are typical commando traits.
He conducts a hit-and-run policy: negotiations with the Syrians approach the last stage andthen – sudden disengagement and quick retreat; negotiations with the Palestinians approachthe final stage – and the same all over again. The same is going to happen to the “civil” and/or”secular” and/or “social” revolution. Everything is tactics; nothing is strategy. All aredaring hit-and-run raids, none of them well-planned actions designed to achieve anobjective and hold on to it.
“Use tricks in making war,” says the Book of Proverbs (in its original Hebrew version). It doesnot advise using tricks to make peace.