Mitchel Report

Report of Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee April 30, 2001

Suleyman Demirel

9th President of the Republic of Turkey

Thorbjoern Jagland

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway

George J. Mitchell, Chairman

Former Member of the United States Senate

Javier Solana

High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, European Union

Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee, April 30, 2001

The Honorable George W. Bush

President of the United States

The White House

Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President,

We enclose herewith the report of the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee.

We sought and received information and advice from a wide range of individuals,organizations, and governments. However, the conclusions and recommendations are oursalone.

We are grateful for the support that you and your administration have provided to theCommittee.

Respectfully,

Suleyman DemirelThorbjoern JaglandWarren B. RudmanJavier SolanaGeorge J. Mitchell

Chairman

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

The Government of Israel (GOI) and the Palestinian Authority (PA) must act swiftly anddecisively to halt the violence. Their immediate objectives then should be to rebuildconfidence and resume negotiations.

During this mission our aim has been to fulfill the mandate agreed at Sharm el-Sheikh. We valuethe support given our work by the participants at the summit, and we commend the parties fortheir cooperation. Our principal recommendation is that they recommit themselves to theSharm el-Sheikh spirit and that they implement the decision made there in 1999 and 2000. Webelieve that the summit participants will support hold action by the parties to achieve theseobjectives.

The restoration of trust is essential, and the parties should take affirmative steps to thisend. Given the high level of hostility and mistrust, the timing and sequence of these steps areobviously crucial. This can be decided only by the parties. We urge them to begin the process ofdecision immediately.

Accordingly, we recommend that steps be taken to:

END THE VIOLENCE

The GOI and the PA should reaffirm their commitment to existing agreements andundertakings and should immediately implement an unconditional cessation ofviolence.

The GOI and PA should immediately resume security cooperation.

REBUILD CONFIDENCE

The PA and GOI should work together to establish a meaningful cooling off period andimplement additional confidence building measures, some of which were detailed in theOctober 2000 Sharm el-Sheikh Statement and some of which were offered by the U.S. onJanuary 7, 2001 in Cairo (see Recommendations section for further description).

The PA and GOI should resume their efforts to identify, condemn and discourageincitement in all its forms.

The PA should make clear through concrete action to Palestinians and Israelis alikethat terrorism is reprehensible and unacceptable, and that the PA will make a 100 percenteffort to prevent terrorist operations and to punish perpetrators. This effort shouldinclude immediate steps to apprehend and incarcerate terrorists operating within thePA’s jurisdiction.

The GOI should freeze all settlement activity, including the “natural growth” ofexisting settlements.

The GOI should ensure that the IDF adopt and enforce policies and proceduresencouraging non-lethal responses to unarmed demonstrators, with a view to minimizingcasualties and friction between the two communities.

The PA should prevent gunmen from using Palestinian populated areas to fire uponIsraeli populated areas and IDF positions. This tactic places civilians on both sides atunnecessary risk.

The GOI should lift closures, transfer to the PA all tax revenues owed, and permitPalestinians who had been employed in Israel to return to their jobs; and should ensurethat security forces and settlers refrain from the destruction of homes and roads, aswell as trees and other agricultural property in Palestinian areas. We acknowledge theGOI’s position that actions of this nature have been taken for security reasons.Nevertheless, the economic effects will persist for years.

The PA should renew cooperation with Israeli security agencies to ensure, to themaximum extent possible, that Palestinians workers employed within Israel are fullyvetted and free of connections to organizations and individuals engaged in terrorism.

The PA and GOI should consider a joint undertaking to preserve and protect holy placessacred to the traditions of Jews, Muslims, and Christians.

The GOI and PA should jointly endorse and support the work of Palestinian and Israelinon-governmental organizations involved in cross-community initiatives linking thetwo peoples.

RESUME NEGOTIATIONS

In the spirit of the Sharm el-Sheikh agreements and understandings of 1999 and 2000, werecommend that the parties meet to reaffirm their commitment to signed agreements and mutualunderstandings, and take corresponding action. This should be the basis for resuming fulland meaningful negotiations.

ABLE OF CONTENTS

• Introduction
• Disucssion
• What Happened?
• Why Did it Happen?
• End the Violence
• Rebuild Confidence
• Resume Negotiations
• Recommendations

INTRODUCTION

On October 17, 2000, at the conclusion of the Middle East Peace Summit at Sharm el-Sheikh,Egypt, the President of the United States spoke on behalf of the participants (the Governmentof Israel, the Palestinian Authority, the Governments of Egypt, Jordan, and the UnitedStates, the United Nations, and the European Union). Among other things, the Presidentstated that:

The United States will develop with the Israelis and Palestinians, as well as inconsultation with the United Nations Secretary General, a committee of fact-finding on theevents of the past several weeks and how to prevent their recurrence. The committee’s reportwill be shared by the U.S. President with the U.N. Secretary General and the parties prior topublication. A final report shall be submitted under the auspices of the U.S. President forpublication. 1

On November 7, 2000, following consultations with the other participants, the Presidentasked us to serve on what has come to be known as the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee. Ina letter to us on December 6, 2000, the President stated that:

The purpose of the Summit, and of the agreement that ensued, was to end the violence, toprevent its recurrence, and to find a path back to the peace process. In its actions and mode ofoperation, therefore, the Committee should be guided by these overriding goals … TheCommittee should strive to steer clear of any step that will intensify mutual blame andfinger-pointing between the parties. As I noted in my previous letter, “the Committee shouldnot become a divisive force or a focal point for blame and recrimination but rather shouldserve to forestall violence and confrontation and provide lessons for the future.” Thisshould not be a tribunal whose purpose is to determine the guilt or innocence of individuals orof the parties; rather, it should be a fact-finding committee whose purpose is to determinewhat happened and how to avoid it recurring in the future. 2

After our first meeting, held before we visited the region, we urged an end to all violence. Ourmeetings and our observations during our subsequent visits to the region have intensifiedour convictions in this regard. Whatever the source, violence will not solve the problems ofthe region. It will only make them worse. Death and destruction will not bring peace, but willdeepen the hatred and harden the resolve on both sides. There is only one way to peace, justice,and security in the Middle East, and that is through negotiation.

Despite their long history and close proximity, some Israelis and Palestinians seem not tofully appreciate each other’s problems and concerns. Some Israelis appear not to comprehendthe humiliation and frustration that Palestinians must endure every day as a result of livingwith the continuing effects of occupation, sustained by the presence of Israeli militaryforces and settlements in their midst, or the determination of the Palestinians to achieveindependence and genuine self-determination. Some Palestinians appear not to comprehendthe extent to which terrorism creates fear among the Israeli people and undermines theirbelief in the possibility of co-existence, or the determination of the GOI to do whatever isnecessary to protect its people.

Fear, hate, anger, and frustration have risen on both sides. The greatest danger of all is thatthe culture of peace, nurtured over the previous decade, is being shattered. In its placethere is a growing sense of futility and despair, and a growing resort to violence.

Political leaders on both sides must act and speak decisively to reverse these dangeroustrends; they must rekindle the desire and the drive for peace. That will be difficult. But itcan be done and it must be done, for the alternative is unacceptable and should be unthinkable.

Two proud peoples share a land and a destiny. Their competing claims and religiousdifferences have led to a grinding, demoralizing, dehumanizing conflict. They can continuein conflict or they can negotiate to find a way to live side-by-side in peace.

There is a record of achievement. In 1991 the first peace conference with Israelis andPalestinians took place in Madrid to achieve peace based on UN Security Council Resolutions242 and 338. In 1993, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel met in Oslo forthe first face-to-face negotiations; they led to mutual recognition and the Declaration ofPrinciples (signed by the parties in Washington, D.C. on September 13, 1993), which provideda road map to reach the destination agreed in Madrid. Since then, important steps have beentaken in Cairo, in Washington, and elsewhere. Last year the parties came very close to apermanent settlement.

So much has been achieved. So much is at risk. If the parties are to succeed in completing theirjourney to their common destination, agreed commitments must be implemented,international law respected, and human rights protected. We encourage them to return tonegotiations, however difficult. It is the only path to peace, justice and security.

DISCUSSION

It is clear from their statements that the participants in the summit of last October hoped andintended that the outbreak of violence, then less than a month old, would soon end. The U.S.President’s letters to us, asking that we make recommendations on how to prevent a recurrenceof violence, reflect that intention.

Yet the violence has not ended. It has worsened. Thus the overriding concern of those in theregion with whom we spoke is to end the violence and to return to the process of shaping asustainable peace. That is what we were told, and were asked to address, by Israelis andPalestinians alike. It was the message conveyed to us as well by President Mubarak of Egypt,King Abdullah of Jordan, and UN Secretary General Annan.

Their concern must be ours. If our report is to have effect, it must deal with the situation thatexists, which is different from that envisaged by the summit participants. In this report, wewill try to answer the questions assigned to us by the Sharm el-Sheikh summit: What happened?Why did it happen?

In light of the current situation, however, we must elaborate on the third part of ourmandate: How can the recurrence of violence be prevented? The relevance and impact of ourwork, in the end, will be measured by the recommendations we make concerning the

following:

• Ending the Violence.
• Rebuilding Confidence.
• Resuming Negotiations.

WHAT HAPPENED?

We are not a tribunal. We complied with the request that we not determine the guilt or innocenceof individuals or of the parties. We did not have the power to compel the testimony of witnessesor the production of documents. Most of the information we received came from the parties and,understandably, it largely tended to support their arguments.

In this part of our report, we do not attempt to chronicle all of the events from late September2000 onward. Rather, we discuss only those that shed light on the underlying causes ofviolence.

In late September 2000, Israeli, Palestinian, and other officials received reports thatMember of the Knesset (now Prime Minister) Ariel Sharon was planning a visit to the Haramal-Sharif/Temple Mount in Jerusalem. Palestinian and U.S. officials urged then PrimeMinister Ehud Barak to prohibit the visit. 3 Mr. Barak told us that he believed the visit wasintended to be an internal political act directed against him by a political opponent, and hedeclined to prohibit it.

Mr. Sharon made the visit on September 28 accompanied by over 1,000 Israeli police officers.Although Israelis viewed the visit in an internal political context, Palestinians saw it ashighly provocative to them. On the following day, in the same place, a large number of unarmedPalestinian demonstrators and a large Israeli police contingent confronted each other.According to the U.S. Department of State, “Palestinians held large demonstrations andthrew stones at police in the vicinity of the Western Wall. Police used rubber-coated metalbullets and live ammunition to disperse the demonstrators, killing 4 persons and injuringabout 200.” 4 According to the GOI, 14 Israeli policemen were injured. 5

Similar demonstrations took place over the following several days. 6 Thus began what hasbecome known as the “Al-Aqsa Intifada” (Al-Aqsa being a mosque at the Haram al-Sharif/TempleMount).

The GOI asserts that the immediate catalyst for the violence was the breakdown of the CampDavid negotiations on July 25, 2000 and the “widespread appreciation in the internationalcommunity of Palestinian responsibility for the impasse.” 7 In this view, Palestinianviolence was planned by the PA leadership, and was aimed at “provoking and incurringPalestinian casualties as a means of regaining the diplomatic initiative.” 8

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) denies the allegation that the intifada wasplanned. It claims, however, that “Camp David represented nothing less than an attempt byIsrael to extend the force it exercises on the ground to negotiations,” 9 and that “the failureof the summit, and the attempts to allocate blame on the Palestinian side only added to thetension on the ground…” 10

From the perspective of the PLO, Israel responded to the disturbances with excessive andillegal use of deadly force against demonstrators; behavior which, in the PLO’s view,reflected Israel’s contempt for the lives and safety of Palestinians. For Palestinians, thewidely seen images of the killing of 12-year-old Muhammad al Durra in Gaza on September 30,shot as he huddled behind his father, reinforced that perception.

From the perspective of the GOI, the demonstrations were organized and directed by thePalestinian leadership to create sympathy for their cause around the world by provokingIsraeli security forces to fire upon demonstrators, especially young people. For Israelis,the lynching of two military reservists, First Sgt. Vadim Novesche and First Cpl. YosefAvrahami, in Ramallah on October 12, reflected a deep-seated Palestinian hatred of Israeland Jews.

What began as a series of confrontations between Palestinian demonstrators and Israelisecurity forces, which resulted in the GOI’s initial restrictions on the movement of peopleand goods in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (closures), has since evolved into a wider array ofviolent actions and responses. There have been exchanges of fire between built-up areas,sniping incidents and clashes between Israeli settlers and Palestinians. There have alsobeen terrorist acts and Israeli reactions thereto (characterized by the GOI ascounter-terrorism), including killings, further destruction of property and economicmeasures. Most recently, there have been mortar attacks on Israeli locations and IDF groundincursions into Palestinian areas.

From the Palestinian perspective, the decision of Israel to characterize the current crisisas “an armed conflict short of war” 11 is simply a means “to justify its assassination policy,its collective punishment policy, and its use of lethal force.” 12 From the Israeliperspective, “The Palestinian leadership have instigated, orchestrated and directed theviolence. It has used, and continues to use, terror and attrition as strategic tools.” 13

In their submissions, the parties traded allegations about the motivation and degree ofcontrol exercised by the other. However, we were provided with no persuasive evidence thatthe Sharon visit was anything other than an internal political act; neither were we providedwith persuasive evidence that the PA planned the uprising.

Accordingly, we have no basis on which to conclude that there was a deliberate plan by the PA toinitiate a campaign of violence at the first opportunity; or to conclude that there was adeliberate plan by the GOI to respond with lethal force.

However, there is also no evidence on which to conclude that the PA made a consistent effort tocontain the demonstrations and control the violence once it began; or that the GOI made aconsistent effort to use non-lethal means to control demonstrations of unarmedPalestinians. Amid rising anger, fear, and mistrust, each side assumed the worst about theother and acted accordingly.

The Sharon visit did not cause the “Al-Aqsa Intifada.” But it was poorly timed and theprovocative effect should have been foreseen; indeed it was foreseen by those who urged thatthe visit be prohibited. More significant were the events that followed: the decision of theIsraeli police on September 29 to use lethal means against the Palestinian demonstrators;and the subsequent failure, as noted above, of either party to exercise restraint.

WHY DID IT HAPPEN?

The roots of the current violence extend much deeper than an inconclusive summit conference.Both sides have made clear a profound disillusionment with the behavior of the other infailing to meet the expectations arising from the peace process launched in Madrid in 1991 andthen in Oslo in 1993. Each side has accused the other of violating specific undertakings andundermining the spirit of their commitment to resolving their political differencespeacefully.

Divergent Expectations: We are struck by the divergent expectations expressed by theparties relating to the implementation of the Oslo process. Results achieved from thisprocess were unthinkable less than 10 years ago. During the latest round of negotiations, theparties were closer to a permanent settlement than ever before.

Nonetheless, Palestinians and Israelis alike told us that the premise on which the Osloprocess is based – that tackling the hard “permanent status” issues be deferred to the end ofthe process – has gradually come under serious pressure. The step-by-step process agreed toby the parties was based on the assumption that each step in the negotiating process would leadto enhanced trust and confidence. To achieve this, each party would have to implement agreedupon commitments and abstain from actions that would be seen by the other as attempts to abusethe process in order to predetermine the shape of the final outcome. If this requirement is notmet, the Oslo road map cannot successfully lead to its agreed destination. Today, each sideblames the other for having ignored this fundamental aspect, resulting in a crisis inconfidence. This problem became even more pressing with the opening of permanent statustalks.

The GOI has placed primacy on moving toward a Permanent Status Agreement in a nonviolentatmosphere, consistent with commitments contained in the agreements between the parties.”Even if slower than was initially envisaged, there has, since the start of the peace processin Madrid in 1991, been steady progress towards the goal of a Permanent Status Agreementwithout the resort to violence on a scale that has characterized recent weeks.” 14 The “goal”is the Permanent Status Agreement, the terms of which must be negotiated by the parties.

The PLO view is that delays in the process have been the result of an Israeli attempt to prolongand solidify the occupation. Palestinians “believed that the Oslo process would yield an endto Israeli occupation in five years,” 15 the timeframe for the transitional period specifiedin the Declaration of Principles. Instead there have been, in the PLO’s view, repeatedIsraeli delays culminating in the Camp David summit, where, “Israel proposed to annex about11.2% of the West Bank (excluding Jerusalem)…” and offered unacceptable proposalsconcerning Jerusalem, security and refugees. “In sum, Israel’s proposals at Camp Davidprovided for Israel’s annexation of the best Palestinian lands, the perpetuation of Israelicontrol over East Jerusalem, a continued Israeli military presence on Palestinianterritory, Israeli control over Palestinian natural resources, airspace and borders, andthe return of fewer than 1% of refugees to their homes.” 16

Both sides see the lack of full compliance with agreements reached since the opening of thepeace process as evidence of a lack of good faith. This conclusion led to an erosion of trusteven before the permanent status negotiations began.

Divergent Perspectives: During the last seven months, these views have hardened intodivergent realities. Each side views the other as having acted in bad faith; as having turnedthe optimism of Oslo into the suffering and grief of victims and their loved ones. In theirstatements and actions, each side demonstrates a perspective that fails to recognize anytruth in the perspective of the other.

The Palestinian Perspective: For the Palestinian side, “Madrid” and “Oslo” heralded theprospect of a State, and guaranteed an end to the occupation and a resolution of outstandingmatters within an agreed time frame. Palestinians are genuinely angry at the continuedgrowth of settlements and at their daily experiences of humiliation and disruption as aresult of Israel’s presence in the Palestinian territories. Palestinians see settlers andsettlements in their midst not only as violating the spirit of the Oslo process, but also as anapplication of force in the form of Israel’s overwhelming military superiority, whichsustains and protects the settlements.

The Interim Agreement provides that “the two parties view the West Bank and Gaza as a singleterritorial unit, the integrity and status of which will be preserved during the interimperiod.” Coupled with this, the Interim Agreement’s prohibition on taking steps which mayprejudice permanent status negotiations denies Israel the right to continue its illegalexpansionist settlement policy. In addition to the Interim Agreement, customaryinternational law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention, prohibits Israel (as anoccupying power) from establishing settlements in occupied territory pending an end to theconflict. 17

The PLO alleges that Israeli political leaders “have made no secret of the fact that theIsraeli interpretation of Oslo was designed to segregate the Palestinians innon-contiguous enclaves, surrounded by Israeli military-controlled borders, withsettlements and settlement roads violating the territories’ integrity.” 18 According tothe PLO, “In the seven years since the [Declaration of Principles], the settler population inthe West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, has doubled to 200,000, and thesettler population in East Jerusalem has risen to 170,000. Israel has constructedapproximately 30 new settlements, and expanded a number of existing ones to house these newsettlers.” 19

The PLO also claims that the GOI has failed to comply with other commitments such as the furtherwithdrawal from the West Bank and the release of Palestinian prisoners. In addition,Palestinians expressed frustration with the impasse over refugees and the deterioratingeconomic circumstances in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The Israeli Perspective: From the GOI perspective, the expansion of settlement activity andthe taking of measures to facilitate the convenience and safety of settlers do not prejudicethe outcome of permanent status negotiations.

Israel understands that the Palestinian side objects to the settlements in the West Bank andthe Gaza Strip. Without prejudice to the formal status of the settlements, Israel acceptsthat the settlements are an outstanding issue on which there will have to be agreement as partof any permanent status resolution between the sides. This point was acknowledged and agreedupon in the Declaration of Principles of 13 September 1993 as well as in other agreementsbetween the two sides. There has in fact been a good deal of discussion on the question ofsettlements between the two sides in the various negotiations toward a permanent statusagreement. 20

Indeed, Israelis point out that at the Camp David summit and during subsequent talks the GOIoffered to make significant concessions with respect to settlements in the context of anoverall agreement.

Security, however, is the key GOI concern. The GOI maintains that the PLO has breached itssolemn commitments by continuing the use of violence in the pursuit of political objectives.”Israel’s principal concern in the peace process has been security. This issue is ofoverriding importance… [S]ecurity is not something on which Israel will bargain orcompromise. The failure of the Palestinian side to comply with both the letter and spirit ofthe security provisions in the various agreements has long been a source of disturbance inIsrael.” 21

According to the GOI, the Palestinian failure takes several forms: institutionalizedanti-Israel, anti-Jewish incitement; the release from detention of terrorists; thefailure to control illegal weapons; and the actual conduct of violent operations, rangingfrom the insertion of riflemen into demonstrations to terrorist attacks on Israelicivilians. The GOI maintains that the PLO has explicitly violated its renunciation ofterrorism and other acts of violence, 22 thereby significantly eroding trust between theparties. The GOI perceives “a thread, implied but nonetheless clear, that runs throughoutthe Palestinian submissions. It is that Palestinian violence against Israel and Israelis issomehow explicable, understandable, legitimate.” 23

END THE VIOLENCE

For Israelis and Palestinians alike the experience of the past several months has beenintensely personal. Through relationships of kinship, friendship, religion, communityand profession, virtually everyone in both societies has a link to someone who has been killedor seriously injured in the recent violence. We were touched by their stories. During our lastvisit to the region, we met with the families of Palestinian and Israeli victims. Theseindividual accounts of grief were heart-rending and indescribably sad. Israeli andPalestinian families used virtually the same words to describe their grief.

When the widow of a murdered Israeli physician — a man of peace whose practice included thetreatment of Arab patients — tells us that it seems that Palestinians are interested inkilling Jews for the sake of killing Jews, Palestinians should take notice. When the parentsof a Palestinian child killed while in his bed by an errant .50 caliber bullet draw similarconclusions about the respect accorded by Israelis to Palestinian lives, Israelis need tolisten. When we see the shattered bodies of children we know it is time for adults to stop theviolence.

With widespread violence, both sides have resorted to portrayals of the other in hostilestereotypes. This cycle cannot be easily broken. Without considerable determination andreadiness to compromise, the rebuilding of trust will be impossible.

Cessation of Violence: Since 1991, the parties have consistently committed themselves, inall their agreements, to the path of nonviolence. They did so most recently in the two Sharmel-Sheikh summits of September 1999 and October 2000. To stop the violence now, the PA and GOIneed not “reinvent the wheel.” Rather, they should take immediate steps to end the violence,reaffirm their mutual commitments, and resume negotiations.

Resumption of Security Cooperation: Palestinian security officials told us that it wouldtake some time – perhaps several weeks – for the PA to reassert full control over armed elementsnominally under its command and to exert decisive influence over other armed elementsoperating in Palestinian areas. Israeli security officials have not disputed theseassertions. What is important is that the PA make an all-out effort to enforce a completecessation of violence and that it be clearly seen by the GOI as doing so. The GOI must likewiseexercise a 100 percent effort to ensure that potential friction points, where Palestinianscome into contact with armed Israelis, do not become stages for renewed hostilities.

The collapse of security cooperation in early October reflected the belief by each party thatthe other had committed itself to a violent course of action. If the parties wish to attain thestandard of 100 percent effort to prevent violence, the immediate resumption of securitycooperation is mandatory.

We acknowledge the reluctance of the PA to be seen as facilitating the work of Israeli securityservices absent an explicit political context (i.e., meaningful negotiations) and underthe threat of Israeli settlement expansion. Indeed, security cooperation cannot besustained without such negotiations and with ongoing actions seen as prejudicing theoutcome of negotiations. However, violence is much more likely to continue without securitycooperation. Moreover, without effective security cooperation, the parties will continueto regard all acts of violence as officially sanctioned.

In order to overcome the current deadlock, the parties should consider how best to revitalizesecurity cooperation. We commend current efforts to that end. Effective cooperationdepends on recreating and sustaining an atmosphere of confidence and good personalrelations. It is for the parties themselves to undertake the main burden of day-to-daycooperation, but they should remain open to engaging the assistance of others infacilitating that work. Such outside assistance should be by mutual consent, should notthreaten good bilateral working arrangements, and should not act as a tribunal or interposebetween the parties. There was good security cooperation until last year that benefited fromthe good offices of the U.S. (acknowledged by both sides as useful), and was also supportedindirectly by security projects and assistance from the European Union. The role of outsideassistance should be that of creating the appropriate framework, sustaining goodwill onboth sides, and removing friction where possible. That framework must be seen to becontributing to the safety and welfare of both communities if there is to be acceptance bythose communities of these efforts.

REBUILD CONFIDENCE

The historic handshake between Chairman Arafat and the late Prime Minister Rabin at the WhiteHouse in September 1993 symbolized the expectation of both parties that the door to thepeaceful resolution of differences had been opened. Despite the current violence and mutualloss of trust, both communities have repeatedly expressed a desire for peace. Channelingthis desire into substantive progress has proved difficult. The restoration of trust isessential, and the parties should take affirmative steps to this end. Given the high level ofhostility and mistrust, the timing and sequence of these steps are obviously crucial. Thiscan be decided only by the parties. We urge them to begin the process of decision immediately.

Terrorism: In the September 1999 Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, the parties pledged to takeaction against “any threat or act of terrorism, violence or incitement.” Although all threecategories of hostilities are reprehensible, it was no accident that “terrorism” was placedat the top of the list.

Terrorism involves the deliberate killing and injuring of randomly selected noncombatantsfor political ends. It seeks to promote a political outcome by spreading terror anddemoralization throughout a population. It is immoral and ultimately self-defeating. Wecondemn it and we urge that the parties coordinate their security efforts to eliminate it.

In its official submissions and briefings, the GOI has accused the PA of supporting terrorismby releasing incarcerated terrorists, by allowing PA security personnel to abet, and in somecases to conduct terrorist operations, and by terminating security cooperation with the GOIThe PA vigorously denies the accusations. But Israelis hold the view that the PA’s leadershiphas made no real effort over the past seven months to prevent anti-Israeli terrorism. Thebelief is, in and of itself, a major obstacle to the rebuilding of confidence.

We believe that the PA has a responsibility to help rebuild confidence by making clear to bothcommunities that terrorism is reprehensible and unacceptable, and by taking all measures toprevent terrorist operations and to punish perpetrators. This effort should includeimmediate steps to apprehend and incarcerate terrorists operating within the PA’sjurisdiction.

Settlements: The GOI also has a responsibility to help rebuild confidence. A cessation ofPalestinian-Israeli violence will be particularly hard to sustain unless the GOI freezesall settlement construction activity. The GOI should also give careful consideration towhether settlements that are focal points for substantial friction are valuable bargainingchips for future negotiations or provocations likely to preclude the onset of productivetalks.

The issue is, of course, controversial. Many Israelis will regard our recommendation as astatement of the obvious, and will support it. Many will oppose it. But settlement activitiesmust not be allowed to undermine the restoration of calm and the resumption of negotiations.

During the half-century of its existence, Israel has had the strong support of the UnitedStates. In international forums, the U.S. has at times cast the only vote on Israel’s behalf.Yet, even in such a close relationship there are some differences. Prominent among thosedifferences is the U.S. Government’s long-standing opposition to the GOI’s policies andpractices regarding settlements. As the then-Secretary of State, James A. Baker, III,commented on May 22, 1991:

Every time I have gone to Israel in connection with the peace process, on each of my four trips,I have been met with the announcement of new settlement activity. This does violate UnitedStates policy. It’s the first thing that Arabs — Arab Governments, the first thing that thePalestinians in the territories — whose situation is really quite desperate – the firstthing they raise when we talk to them. I don’t think there is any bigger obstacle to peace thanthe settlement activity that continues not only unabated but at an enhanced pace. 24

The policy described by Secretary Baker, on behalf of the Administration of President GeorgeH. W. Bush, has been, in essence, the policy of every American administration over the pastquarter century. 25

Most other countries, including Turkey, Norway, and those of the European Union, have alsobeen critical of Israeli settlement activity, in accordance with their views that suchsettlements are illegal under international law and not in compliance with previousagreements.

On each of our two visits to the region there were Israeli announcements regarding expansionof settlements, and it was almost always the first issue raised by Palestinians with whom wemet. During our last visit, we observed the impact of 6,400 settlers on 140,000 Palestiniansin Hebron 26 and 6,500 settlers on over 1,100,000 Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. 27 The GOIdescribes its policy as prohibiting new settlements but permitting expansion of exitingsettlements to accommodate “natural growth.” Palestinians contend that there is nodistinction between “new” and “expanded” settlements; and that, except for a brief freezeduring the tenure of Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin, there has been a continuing, aggressiveeffort by Israel to increase the number and size of settlements.

The subject has been widely discussed within Israel. The Ha aretz English Language Edition

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editorial of April 10, 2001 stated: A government which seeks to argue that its goalis to reach a solution to the conflict with the Palestinians through peaceful means, and istrying at this stage to bring an end to the violence and terrorism, must announce an end toconstruction in the settlements. 28

The circumstances in the region are much changed from those which existed nearly 20 years ago.Yet, President Reagan’s words remain relevant: “The immediate adoption of a settlementsfreeze by Israel, more than any other action, could create the confidence needed…”

Beyond the obvious confidence-building qualities of a settlement freeze, we note that manyof the confrontations during this conflict have occurred at points where Palestinians,settlers, and security forces protecting the settlers, meet. Keeping both the peace andthese friction points will be very difficult.

Reducing Tension: We were told by both Palestinians and Israelis that emotions generated bythe many recent deaths and funerals have fueled additional confrontations, and, in effect,maintained the cycle of violence. We cannot urge one side or the other to refrain fromdemonstrations. But both sides must make clear that violent demonstrations will not betolerated. We can and do urge that both sides exhibit a greater respect for human life whendemonstrators confront security personnel. In addition, a renewed effort to stop theviolence might feature, for a limited time, a “cooling off” period during which publicdemonstrations at or near friction points will be discouraged in order to break the cycle ofviolence. To the extent that demonstrations continue, we urge that demonstrators andsecurity personnel keep their distance from one another to reduce the potential for lethalconfrontation.

Actions and Responses: Members of the Committee staff witnessed an incident involving stonethrowing in Ramallah from the perspectives, on the ground, of both sides. The peopleconfronting one another were mostly young men. The absence of senior leadership on the IDFside was striking. Likewise, the absence of responsible security and other officialscounseling restraint on the Palestinian side was obvious.

Concerning such confrontations, the GOI takes the position that “Israel is engaged in anarmed conflict short of war. This is not a civilian disturbance or a demonstration or a riot. Itis characterized by live-fire attacks on a significant scale [emphasis added] … [T]heattacks are carried out by a well-armed and organized militia…” 29 Yet, the GOIacknowledges that of some 9,000 “attacks” by Palestinians against Israelis, “some 2,700[about 30 percent] involved the use of automatic weapons, rifles, hand guns, grenades, [and]explosives of other kinds.” 30

Thus, for the first three months of the current uprising, most incidents did not involvePalestinian use of firearms and explosives. B Tselem reported that, “according to IDFfigures, 73 percent of the incidents [from September 29 to December 2, 2000] did not includePalestinian gunfire. Despite this, it was in these incidents that most of the Palestinians[were] killed and wounded. . .” 31 Altogether, nearly 500 people were killed and over 10,000injured over the past seven months; the overwhelming majority in both categories werePalestinian. Many of these deaths were avoidable, as were many Israeli deaths.

Israel’s characterization of the conflict, as noted above, is overly broad, for it does notadequately describe the variety of incidents reported since late September 2000. Moreover,by thus defining the conflict, the IDF has suspended its policy of mandating investigationsby the Department of Military Police Investigations whenever a Palestinian in theterritories dies at the hands of an IDF soldier in an incident not involving terrorism. In thewords of the GOI, “Where Israel considers that there is reason to investigate particularincidents, it does so, although, given the circumstances of armed conflict, it does not do soroutinely.” 32 We believe, however, that by abandoning the blanket “armed conflict short ofwar” characterization and by re-instituting mandatory military police investigations,the GOI could help mitigate deadly violence and help rebuild mutual confidence.Notwithstanding the danger posed by stone-throwers, an effort should be made todifferentiate between terrorism and protests.

Controversy has arisen between the parties over what Israel calls the “targeting ofindividual enemy combatants.” 33 The PLO describes these actions as “extra-judicialexecutions,” 34 and claims that Israel has engaged in an “assassination policy” that is “inclear violation of Article 32 of the Fourth Geneva Convention… .” 35 The GOI states that,”whatever action Israel has taken has been taken firmly within the bounds of the relevant andaccepted principles relating to the conduct of hostilities.” 36

With respect to demonstrations, the GOI has acknowledged “that individual instances ofexcessive response may have occurred. To a soldier or a unit coming under Palestinian attack,the equation is not that of the Israeli army versus some stone throwing Palestinianprotesters. It is a personal equation.” 37

We understand this concern, particularly since rocks can maim or even kill. It is no easymatter for a few young soldiers, confronted by large numbers of hostile demonstrators, tomake fine legal distinctions on the spot. Still, this “personal equation” must fit within anorganizational ethic; in this case, The Ethical Code of the Israel Defense Forces, whichstates, in part:

The sanctity of human life in the eyes of the IDF servicemen will find expression in all oftheir actions, in deliberate and meticulous planning, in safe and intelligent training andin proper execution of their mission. In evaluating the risk to self and others, they will usethe appropriate standards and will exercise constant care to limit injury to life to theextent required to accomplish the mission. 38

Those required to respect the IDF ethical code are largely draftees, as the IDF is a conscriptforce. Active duty enlisted personnel, noncommissioned officers and junior officers — thecategories most likely to be present at friction points — are young, often teenagers. Unlessmore senior career personnel or reservists are stationed at friction points, no IDFpersonnel present in these sensitive areas have experience to draw upon from previousviolent Israeli-Palestinian confrontations. We think it is essential, especially in thecontext of restoring confidence by minimizing deadly confrontations, that the IDF deploymore senior, experienced soldiers to these sensitive points.

There were incidents where IDF soldiers have used lethal force, including live ammunitionand modified metal-cored rubber rounds, against unarmed demonstrators throwing stones. 39The IDF should adopt crowd-control tactics that minimize the potential for deaths andcasualties, withdrawing metal-cored rubber rounds from general use and using insteadrubber baton rounds without metal cores.

We are deeply concerned about the public safety implications of exchanges of fire betweenpopulated areas, in particular between Israeli settlements and neighboring Palestinianvillages. Palestinian gunmen have directed small arms fire at Israeli settlements and atnearby IDF positions from within or adjacent to civilian dwellings in Palestinian areas,thus endangering innocent, Israeli and Palestinian civilians alike. We condemn thepositioning of gunmen within or near civilian dwellings. The IDF often responds to suchgunfire with heavy caliber weapons, sometimes resulting in deaths and injuries to innocentPalestinians. An IDF officer told us at the Ministry of Defense on March 23, 2001 that, “Whenshooting comes from a building we respond, and sometimes there are innocent people in thebuilding.” Obviously, innocent people are injured and killed during exchanges of thisnature. We urge that such provocations cease and that the IDF exercise maximum restraint inits responses if they do occur. Inappropriate or excessive uses of force often lead toescalation.

We are aware of IDF sensitivities about these subjects. More than once we were asked: “Whatabout Palestinian rules of engagement? What about a Palestinian code of ethics for theirmilitary personnel?” These are valid questions.

On the Palestinian side there are disturbing ambiguities in the basic areas ofresponsibility and accountability. The lack of control exercised by the PA over its ownsecurity personnel and armed elements affiliated with the PA leadership is very troubling.We urge the PA to take all necessary steps to establish a clear and unchallenged chain ofcommand for armed personnel operating under its authority. We recommend that the PAinstitute and enforce effective standards of conduct and accountability, both within theuniformed ranks and between the police and the civilian political leadership to which itreports.

Incitement: In their submissions and briefings to the Committee, both sides expressedconcerns about hateful language and images emanating from the other, citing numerousexamples of hostile sectarian and ethnic rhetoric in the Palestinian and Israeli media, inschool curricula and in statements by religious leaders, politicians and others.

We call on the parties to renew their formal commitments to foster mutual understanding andtolerance and to abstain from incitement and hostile propaganda. We condemn hate languageand incitement in all its forms. We suggest that the parties be particularly cautious aboutusing words in a manner that suggests collective responsibility.

Economic and Social Impact of Violence: Further restrictions on the movement of people andgoods have been imposed by Israel on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. These closures take threeforms: those which restrict movement between the Palestinian areas and Israel; those(including curfews) which restrict movement within the Palestinian areas; and those whichrestrict movement from the Palestinian areas to foreign countries. These measures havedisrupted the lives of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians; they have increasedPalestinian unemployment to an estimated 40 percent, in part by preventing some 140,000Palestinians from working in Israel; and have stripped away about one-third of thePalestinian gross domestic product. Moreover, the transfer of tax and customs duty revenuesowed to the PA by Israel has been suspended, leading to a serious fiscal crisis in the PA.

Of particular concern to the PA has been the destruction by Israeli security forces andsettlers of tens of thousands of olive and fruit trees and other agricultural property. Theclosures have had other adverse effects, such as preventing civilians from access to urgentmedical treatment and preventing students from attending school.

The GOI maintains that these measures were taken in order to protect Israeli citizens fromterrorism. Palestinians characterize these measures as “collective punishment.” The GOIdenies the allegation: Israel has not taken measures that have had an economic impact simplyfor the sake of taking such measures or for reasons of harming the Palestinian economy. Themeasures have been taken for reasons of security. Thus, for example, the closure of thePalestinian territories was taken in order to prevent, or at least minimize the risks of,terrorist attacks. … The Palestinian leadership has made no attempt to control thisactivity and bring it to an end. 40

Moreover, the GOI points out that violence in the last quarter of 2000 cost the Israeli economy$1.2 billion (USD), and that the loss continues at a rate of approximately $150 million (USD)per month. 41 We acknowledge Israel’s security concerns. We believe, however, that the GOIshould lift closures, transfer to the PA all revenues owed, and permit Palestinians who havebeen employed in Israel to return to their jobs. Closure policies play into the hands ofextremists seeking to expand their constituencies and thereby contribute to escalation.The PA should resume cooperation with Israeli security agencies to ensure that Palestinianworkers employed within Israel are fully vetted and free of connections to terrorists andterrorist organizations.

International development assistance has from the start been an integral part of the peaceprocess, with an aim to strengthen the socio-economic foundations for peace. Thisassistance today is more important than ever. We urge the international community to sustainthe development agenda of the peace process.

Holy Places: It is particularly regrettable that places such as the Temple Mount/Haramal-Sharif in Jerusalem, Joseph’s Tomb in Nablus, and Rachel’s Tomb in Bethlehem have been thescenes of violence, death and injury. These are places of peace, prayer and reflection whichmust be accessible to all believers.

Places deemed holy by Muslims, Jews, and Christians merit respect, protection andpreservation. Agreements previously reached by the parties regarding holy places must beupheld. The GOI and the PA should create a joint initiative to defuse the sectarian aspect oftheir political dispute by preserving and protecting such places. Efforts to developinter-faith dialogue should be encouraged.

International Force: One of the most controversial subjects raised during our inquiry wasthe issue of deploying an international force to the Palestinian areas. The PA is strongly infavor of having such a force to protect Palestinian civilians and their property from the IDFand from settlers. The GOI is just as adamantly opposed to an “international protectionforce,” believing that it would prove unresponsive to Israeli security concerns andinterfere with bilateral negotiations to settle the conflict.

We believe that to be effective such a force would need the support of both parties. We note thatinternational forces deployed in this region have been or are in a position to fulfill theirmandates and make a positive contribution only when they were deployed with the consent of allof the parties involved.

During our visit to Hebron, we were briefed by personnel of the Temporary InternationalPresence in Hebron (TIPH), a presence to which both parties have agreed. The TIPH is chargedwith observing an explosive situation and writing reports on their observations. If theparties agree, as a confidence-building measure, to draw upon TIPH personnel to help themmanage other friction points, we hope that TIPH contributors could accommodate such arequest.

Cross-Community Initiatives: Many described to us the near absolute loss of trust. It was allthe more inspiring, therefore, to find groups (such as the Parent’s Circle and the EconomicCooperation Foundation) dedicated to cross-community understanding in spite of all thathas happened. We commend them and their important work.

Regrettably, most of the work of this nature has stopped during the current conflict. To helprebuild confidence, the GOI and PA should jointly endorse and support the work of Israeli andPalestinian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) already involved inconfidence-building through initiatives linking both sides. It is important that the PA andGOI support cross-community organizations and initiatives, including the provision ofhumanitarian assistance to Palestinian villages by Israeli NGOs. Providing travel permitsfor participants is essential. Cooperation between the humanitarian organizations and themilitary/security services of the parties should be encouraged and institutionalized.

Such programs can help build, albeit slowly, constituencies for peace among Palestiniansand Israelis and can provide safety nets during times of turbulence. Organizations involvedin this work are vital for translating good intentions into positive actions.

RESUME NEGOTIATIONS

Israeli leaders do not wish to be perceived as “rewarding violence.” Palestinian leaders donot wish to be perceived as “rewarding occupation.” We appreciate the political constraintson leaders of both sides. Nevertheless, if the cycle of violence is to be broken and the searchfor peace resumed, there needs to be a new bilateral relationship incorporating bothsecurity cooperation and negotiations.

We cannot prescribe to the parties how best to pursue their political objectives. Yet theconstruction of a new bilateral relationship solidifying and transcending an agreedcessation of violence requires intelligent risk-taking. It requires, in the firstinstance, that each party again be willing to regard the other as a partner. Partnership, inturn, requires at this juncture something more than was agreed in the Declaration ofPrinciples and in subsequent agreements. Instead of declaring the peace process to be”dead,” the parties should determine how they will conclude their common journey along theiragreed “road map,” a journey which began in Madrid and continued — in spite of problems –until very recently.

To define a starting point is for the parties to decide. Both parties have stated that theyremain committed to their mutual agreements and undertakings. It is time to explore furtherimplementation. The parties should declare their intention to meet on this basis, in order toresume full and meaningful negotiations, in the spirit of their undertakings at Sharmel-Sheikh in 1999 and 2000.

Neither side will be able to achieve its principal objectives unilaterally or withoutpolitical risk. We know how hard it is for leaders to act — especially if the action can becharacterized by political opponents as a concession — without getting something inreturn. The PA must — as it has at previous critical junctures — take steps to reassure Israelon security matters. The GOI must — as it has in the past — take steps to reassure the PA onpolitical matters. Israelis and Palestinians should avoid, in their own actions andattitudes, giving extremists, common criminals and revenge seekers the final say indefining their joint future. This will not be easy if deadly incidents occur in spite ofeffective cooperation. Notwithstanding the daunting difficulties, the very foundation ofthe trust required to re-establish a functioning partnership consists of each side makingsuch strategic reassurances to the other.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The GOI and the PA must act swiftly and decisively to halt the violence. Their immediateobjectives then should be to rebuild confidence and resume negotiations. What we are askingis not easy. Palestinians and Israelis – not just their leaders, but two publics at large – havelost confidence in one another. We are asking political leaders to do, for the sake of theirpeople, the politically difficult: to lead without knowing how many will follow.

During this mission our aim has been to fulfill the mandate agreed at Sharm el-Sheikh. We valuethe support given our work by the participants at the summit, and we commend the parties fortheir cooperation. Our principal recommendation is that they recommit themselves to theSharm el-Sheikh spirit, and that they implement the decisions made there in 1999 and 2000. Webelieve that the summit participants will support bold action by the parties to achieve theseobjectives.

END THE VIOLENCE

The GOI and the PA should reaffirm their commitment to existing agreements and undertakingsand should immediately implement an unconditional cessation of violence.

Anything less than a complete effort by both parties to end the violence will render the effortitself ineffective, and will likely be interpreted by the other side as evidence of hostileintent.

The GOI and PA should immediately resume security cooperation.

Effective bilateral cooperation aimed at preventing violence will encourage theresumption of negotiations. We are particularly concerned that, absent effective,transparent security cooperation, terrorism and other acts of violence will continue andmay be seen as officially sanctioned whether they are or not. The parties should considerwidening the scope of security cooperation to reflect the priorities of both communities andto seek acceptance for these efforts from those communities.

We acknowledge the PA’s position that security cooperation presents a political difficultyabsent a suitable political context, i.e., the relaxation of stringent Israeli securitymeasures combined with ongoing, fruitful negotiations. We also acknowledge the PA’s fearthat, with security cooperation in hand, the GOI may not be disposed to deal forthrightly withPalestinian political concerns. We believe that security cooperation cannot long besustained if meaningful negotiations are unreasonably deferred, if security measures “onthe ground” are seen as hostile, or if steps are taken that are perceived as provocative or asprejudicing the outcome of negotiations.

REBUILD CONFIDENCE

The PA and GOI should work together to establish a meaningful “cooling off period” andimplement additional confidence building measures, some of which were proposed in theOctober 2000 Sharm el-Sheikh Statement and some of which were offered by the U.S. on January 7,2001 in Cairo.

The PA and GOI should resume their efforts to identify, condemn and discourage incitement inall its forms.

The PA should make clear through concrete action to Palestinians and Israelis alike thatterrorism is reprehensible and unacceptable, and that the PA will make a 100 percent effort toprevent terrorist operations and to punish perpetrators. This effort should includeimmediate steps to apprehend and incarcerate terrorists operating within the PA’sjurisdiction.

The GOI should freeze all settlement activity, including the “natural growth” of existingsettlements.

The kind of security cooperation desired by the GOI cannot for long co-exist with settlementactivity described very recently by the European Union as causing “great concern” and by theU.S. as “provocative.”

The GOI should give careful consideration to whether settlements which are focal points forsubstantial friction are valuable bargaining chips for future negotiations orprovocations likely to preclude the onset of productive talks.

The GOI may wish to make it clear to the PA that a future peace would pose no threat to theterritorial contiguity of a Palestinian State to be established in the West Bank and the GazaStrip.

The IDF should consider withdrawing to positions held before September 28, 2000 which

will reduce the number of friction points and the potential for violent confrontations.

The GOI should ensure that the IDF adopt and enforce policies and procedures encouragingnon-lethal responses to unarmed demonstrators, with a view to minimizing casualties andfriction between the two communities. The IDF should:

Re-institute, as a matter of course, military police investigations into Palestiniandeaths resulting from IDF actions in the Palestinian territories in incidents not involvingterrorism. The IDF should abandon the blanket characterization of the current uprising as”an armed conflict short of war,” which fails to discriminate between terrorism and protest.

Adopt tactics of crowd-control that minimize the potential for deaths and casualties,including the withdrawal of metal-cored rubber rounds from general use.

Ensure that experienced, seasoned personnel are present for duty at all times at knownfriction points.

Ensure that the stated values and standard operating procedures of the IDF effectivelyinstill the duty of caring for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as well as Israelisliving there, consistent with The Ethical Code of The IDF.

The GOI should lift closures, transfer to the PA all tax revenues owed, and permitPalestinians who had been employed in Israel to return to their jobs; and should ensure thatsecurity forces and settlers refrain from the destruction of homes and roads, as well as treesand other agricultural property in Palestinian areas. We acknowledge the GOI’s positionthat actions of this nature have been taken for security reasons. Nevertheless, theireconomic effects will persist for years.

The PA should renew cooperation with Israeli security agencies to ensure, to the maximumextent possible, that Palestinian workers employed within Israel are fully vetted and freeof connections to organizations and individuals engaged in terrorism.

The PA should prevent gunmen from using Palestinian populated areas to fire upon Israelipopulated areas and IDF positions. This tactic places civilians on both sides at unnecessaryrisk.

The GOI and IDF should adopt and enforce policies and procedures designed to ensure that theresponse to any gunfire emanating from Palestinian populated areas minimizes the danger tothe lives and property of Palestinian civilians, bearing in mind that it is probably theobjective of gunmen to elicit an excessive IDF response.

The GOI should take all necessary steps to prevent acts of violence by settlers.

The parties should abide by the provisions of the Wye River Agreement prohibiting illegalweapons.

The PA should take all necessary steps to establish a clear and unchallenged chain of commandfor armed personnel operating under its authority.

The PA should institute and enforce effective standards of conduct and accountability, bothwithin the uniformed ranks and between the police and the civilian political leadership towhich it reports.

The PA and GOI should consider a joint undertaking to preserve and protect holy places sacredto the traditions of Muslims, Jews, and Christians. An initiative of this nature might help toreverse a disturbing trend: the increasing use of religious themes to encourage and justifyviolence.

The GOI and PA should jointly endorse and support the work of Palestinian and Israelinon-governmental organizations (NGOs) involved in cross-community initiatives linkingthe two peoples. It is important that these activities, including the provision ofhumanitarian aid to Palestinian villages by Israeli NGOs, receive the full backing of bothparties.

RESUME NEGOTIATIONS

We reiterate our belief that a 100 percent effort to stop the violence, an immediateresumption of security cooperation and an exchange of confidence building measures are allimportant for the resumption of negotiations. Yet none of these steps will long be sustainedabsent a return to serious negotiations.

It is not within our mandate to prescribe the venue, the basis or the agenda of negotiations.However, in order to provide an effective political context for practical cooperationbetween the parties, negotiations must not be unreasonably deferred and they must, in ourview, manifest a spirit of compromise, reconciliation and partnership, notwithstandingthe events of the past seven months.

In the spirit of the Sharm el-Sheikh agreements and understandings of 1999 and 2000, werecommend that the parties meet to reaffirm their commitment to signed agreements and mutualunderstandings, and take corresponding action. This should be the basis for resuming fulland meaningful negotiations.

The parties are at a crossroads. If they do not return to the negotiating table, they face theprospect of fighting it out for years on end, with many of their citizens leaving for distantshores to live their lives and raise their children. We pray they make the right choice. Thatmeans stopping the violence now. Israelis and Palestinians have to live, work, and prospertogether. History and geography have destined them to be neighbors. That cannot be changed.Only when their actions are guided by this awareness will they be able to develop the vision andreality of peace and shared prosperity.

Suleyman Demirel

9th President of the Republic of Turkey

Thorbjoern Jagland

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway

George J. Mitchell, Chairman

Former Member and Majority Leader of the United States Senate

Warren B. Rudman

Former Member of the United States Senate

Javier Solana

High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, European Union

NOTES:

1 – A copy of the statement is attached.

2 – Copies of the President’s letters are attached.

3 – When informed of the planned visit, Ambassador Dennis Ross (President Clinton’s Middle East Envoy) said that he told Israeli Minister of Interior Shlomo Ben-Ami, “I can think of a lot of bad ideas, but I can’t think of a worse one.” See Jane Perlez, “US Envoy Recalls the Day Pandora’s Box Wouldn’t Shut,” The New York Times, January 29, 2001.

4 – U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2000 (Israel), Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, February 2001,

5 – Government of Israel, First Statement, 28 December 2000 (hereafter “GOI, First Statement”), para 187. B’Tselem (The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories) reported that 70 police were injured. See Events on the Temple Mount – 29 September 2000: Interim Report,

6 – Disturbances also occurred within Israel’s Arab community, resulting in thirteen deaths. These events do not fall within the mandate of this Committee and are the subject of an official GOI inquiry.

7 – GOI, First Statement, para 118.

8 – Id., para 110. According to the GOI, the Palestinian Minister of Posts and Telecommunications declared at a rally in Lebanon in March 2001 that the confrontation with Israel had been planned following the Camp David Summit. See Government of Israel, Second Statement, 20 March 2001 (hereafter, “GOI, Second Statement”), para 2. The PA provided the Committee a translation of a letter from the Minister, dated March 12, 2001, in which the Minister denied saying that the intifada was planned, and that his statement in Lebanon was misquoted and taken out of context. We were told by an Israeli Defense Force (IDF) intelligence officer that while the declaration itself was not definitive, it represented an “open-source” version of what was known to the IDF through “other means”; knowledge and means not shared by the IDF with the Committee.

9 – Palestine Liberation Organization, Preliminary Submission of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the International Commission of Inquiry, December 8, 2000, p. 10. Note: submissions to the Committee from the Palestinian side were made by the PLO.

10 – Palestine Liberation Organization, A Crisis of Faith: Second Submission of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee, December 30,2000 (hereafter “PLO, Second Submission”), p. 16.

11 – See GOI, First Statement, para 286.

12 – Palestine Liberation Organization, Third Submission of The Palestine Liberation Organization to the Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee, April 3, 2001 (hereafter “PLO, Third Submission”), p. 51.

13 – GOI, Second Statement, para 4.

14 – GOI, First Statement, para 19.

15 – PLO, Third Submission, p. 25.

16 – Id., pp. 46-50.

17 – Id., pp. 27-28.

18 – PLO, Second Submission, p. 14.

19 – Id., pp. 14-15.

20 – GOI, Second Statement, para 82.

21 – GOI, First Statement, para 99.

22 – GOI Second Statement, para 19, referring to the Exchange of Notes Between the Prime Minister of Israel and the Chairman of the PLO, 9- 10 September 1993.

23 – Id., para 21.

24 – Testimony before the United States House of Representatives Committee onAppropriations, 102nd Congress, May 22, 1991.

25 – On March 21, 1980, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, speaking on behalf of the CarterAdministration, stated: “U.S. policy toward the establishment of Israeli settlements in theoccupied territories is unequivocal and has long been a matter of public record. We consider itto becontrary to international law and an impediment to the successful conclusion of the Middle Eastpeace process.”

26 – On September 1, 1982, President Ronald Reagan announced what came to be known as TheReagan Plan for the Middle East, stating that: “[T]he immediate adoption of a settlementsfreeze by Israel, more than any other action, could create the confidence needed for widerparticipation in these talks. Further settlement activity is in no way necessary for thesecurity ofIsrael and only diminishes the confidence of the Arabs that a final outcome can be freely andfairly negotiated.”

27 – On December 16, 1996, at a press conference, President Bill Clinton stated: “It juststands to reason that anything that preempts the outcome [of the negotiations] … cannot behelpful in making peace. I don’t think anything should be done that would be seen as preemptingthe outcome.” Asked if he viewed the settlements as an obstacle to peace, President Clintonreplied, “Absolutely. Absolutely.”

28 – On April 5, 2001, a U.S. State Department spokesman, speaking for the currentadministration, stated: “Continuing settlement activity does risk inflaming an already volatilesituation in the region”; he described that activity as “provocative.”

There are 400 settlers in the “H2” sector of central Hebron, and 6,000 in the Kiryat Arba settlement on the eastern edge of the city. See “An Introduction to the City of Hebron,” published by the Temporary International Presence in Hebron,Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2000,

• Ha’aretz, English Language Edition, April 10, 2001, p. 5.
• GOI, First Statement, para 286.
• Id., para 189.
• B’Tselem, Illusions of Restraint: Human Rights Violations During the Events in the Occupied Territories, 29 September-2 December 2000, December 2000, p. 4.
• GOI, First Statement, para 306. “The stated policy of the IDF is that whenever a Palestinian in the Occupied Territories dies at the hands of a soldier, an investigation is to be made by the Department of Military Police Investigations (MPI), except in cases defined as ‘hostile terrorist activity.'” See B’Tselem, Illusions of Restraint, p. 24.

See also, Alex Fishman, “The Intifada, the IDF and Investigations,” Yediot Aharonot (in English, Richard Bell Press, 1996, Ltd.), January 19, 2001.

• GOI, Second Statement, para 69-80.
• PLO, Third Submission, p. 69.
• Id., p. 60.
• GOI, Second Statement, para 78.
• GOI, First Statement, para 305.
• Israel Defense Forces, The Ethical Code of the Israel Defense Forces, See, e.g., U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2000 (Occupied Territories), See also, B’Tselem, Illusions of Restraint, pp. 15-16, reporting on the alleged practice of separating rubber bullets into individual rounds, as opposed to firing them properly in a bound cluster of three. Separation increases range and lethality.
• GOI, Second Statement, para 92.
• Id., para 89.