My first impression of Abu-Mazen was of a serious, methodical, somewhat aloof introvert. Hereminded me of a high-school principal, very different from Arafat, the impulsiveextrovert, prone to personal gestures, exuding warmth to all around him.
I met Abu-Mazen for the first time some 28 years ago. We were secretly in Tunis to meet YasserArafat. There were three of us: Matti Peled, a general in the reserves, Ya’acov Arnon, a formerDirector General of the Treasury and I. We met Abu-Mazen first to prepare practical proposalsfor joint actions, to be put before the “Old Man”, as Arafat – then 54 – was called.
I had first heard mention of the name Abu-Mazen nine years earlier, with my first secretcontacts with senior PLO officials. They told me that the Fatah leadership had appointed acommittee of three for contacts with Israelis. They were the “three Abus” (as I called them):Abu-Amar (Yasser Arafat), Abu-Iyad (Salah Halaf) and Abu-Mazen (Mahmud Abbas).
Abu-Mazen was directly responsible for the contacts that started in 1974. At the first stage,they were conducted with me personally, but, from the autumn of 1976 on, the Israeli partnerwas the “Israeli Council for Israeli-Palestinian Peace”. The Palestinians who met us wereSa’id Hamami and Issam Sartawi – who were both murdered by the Iraqi-supported Palestinianarch-terrorist, Abu-Nidal, a mortal enemy of Arafat.
When Arafat and Abu-Mazen were both present at meetings with us, I got a clear picture of theirmutual standing. The detailed discussions were conducted by Abu-Mazen, who had a goodknowledge of things Israeli, but it was Arafat who, in the end, made the decisions. More thanonce I had the impression that the senior PLO leaders were quite content to leave to Arafat theresponsibility for the courageous, dangerous and unpopular decisions that led up to theagreement with Israel.
Now there is a new situation. Arafat has agreed to appoint Abu-Mazen Prime Minister. (The veryfact that the whole world, and Israel too, have welcomed the Palestinian “government” and”Prime Minister” is a big step towards the establishment of the State of Palestine. In OsloIsrael still strenuously resisted terms like “President”, “government” and “parliament”for the Palestinians.)
Abu-Mazen has taken upon himself a great responsibility vis-a-vis his own people and theworld. He has put himself in a well-nigh impossible position.
Sharon & Co. demand that he first of all put an end to “terrorism” (“armed struggle” inPalestinian parlance), liquidate the “terrorist organizations” collect their arms andprevent “incitement”. Only after the successful completion of all this can realnegotiations begin. Freezing the construction of settlements, of course, should not even bementioned at this stage.
The Palestinian public, on the other hand, demands that first of all the Israeli army shouldleave the Palestinian towns, stopping “targeted assassinations”, settlement activity,the demolition of homes and all other acts of oppression, and start real negotiations for theestablishment of the State of Palestine.
This threatens to become a deadlock.
If the US and Europe exert massive pressure on Sharon, the way they have put massive pressure onArafat, the deadlock might be broken. The Israeli army would withdraw, the situation in thePalestinian territories would change completely, the Palestinians would be able to breatheagain and Abu-Mazen would appear as a leader who had already attained a great achievement. Thepopularity of the extreme organizations would decline.
Even if this happened, Abu-Mazen could not dream of making mass arrests, destroying theorganizations and confiscating their weapons. There is nothing the Palestinians fear morethan fratricidal war. However, the pressure of Palestinian public opinion would lead, atleast, to an effective armistice. Even the extreme organizations are sensitive to theattitudes of their public – if it wants quiet, there will be quiet. That has already happened inthe first period after the Oslo agreement.
Let’s assume that this happens. The attacks stop almost completely (there will always be someindividuals and local groups who feel they have to act on their own). The Abu-Mazen governmentfunctions well in the Palestinian towns and villages. Then what?
After the publication of the Road Map, Sharon will propose dozens of “corrections”. Even nowthe “map” is strongly tilted towards Sharon. While the Palestinians gave up 78% of the countryin Oslo and accepted the remaining 22% for building their own state, and have declared thatthey want to live in peaceful co-existence with Israel, Sharon talks about “painfulconcessions” without spelling out what he really means.
If Sharon’s “corrections” are even partly accepted, the plan will lose most of what content itstill has. Abu-Mazen will stand there with empty hands, the negotiations will stagnate as inprevious rounds. Gradually, the Palestinians will be forced to the conclusion that they canachieve nothing without violence, the fighting organizations will regain the initiativeand the armed struggle will resume.
Sharon and Bush will blame the Palestinians, of course. They will say that Abu-Mazen “has notdelivered the goods”. The Palestinians, for their part, will say that Abu-Mazen is naive,that he has fallen into an American-Israeli trap. He will resign, Arafat’s prestige will riseto new heights.
The next chapter can be foreseen. The Christian fundamentalists and Zionist neo-cons, whocontrol Washington at this time, will demand that Sharon be given a free hand. ThePalestinians will embark on the third intifada , more extreme than the two before. Blood andfire and columns of smoke.
It could be different. For example: the US stops treating the Quartet with contempt, pressureis put on Sharon, Bush is not reelected, the negotiations bear fruit, the peace camp wins inIsrael, the Palestinian state is founded in peace.
In the Holy Land, miracles have happened before.
But in the meantime, don’t envy Abu-Mazen.