There is little controversy about the facts: last Thursday, in an IDF action in Rafah, at leasteight Palestinians were killed (the number will probably climb, since some of the woundedwere severely hurt). Five of those killed were woman and children. Almost fifty people werewounded – many of them children who had just left their school after lessons.
The event took place on the “Philadelphi” axis, a narrow strip of land designed to separate theGaza area from neighboring Egypt. The Palestinians dig tunnels under the strip in order tomove people, weapons and goods. The IDF endeavors to prevent it.
Thursday, the IDF sent a bulldozer, guarded by tanks and armored troop-carriers, to block thetunnels.
According to the army version, fire was opened on the bulldozer and the force. The brigadecommander gave a tank commander permission to fire shells at the “sources of fire”. All in all,five shells were fired at the densely populated refugee camp, including “flanchette” shellswhich spread thousands of deadly steel arrows, an especially inhuman weapon the use of whichis forbidden by international law. The IDF suffered no casualties.
The army alleges that among the Palestinians killed were three “armed men” who had shot at thebulldozer. The Palestinians contend that none of them was a known member of a fightingorganization. (This is not necessarily a contradiction: nowadays any Palestinian is liableto open fire on the occupation forces.)
The Palestinians speak about a “massacre”. Israeli spokespersons say they regret the deathsof the children. The Americans asked Israel to exercise restraint. “The world” was silentlyreproachful.
This was not an exceptional occurrence. It has become almost routine.
Who is to blame? Let’s try to compose a list.
First: the occupation.
The occupation creates resistance. In order to overcome the resistance, the occupation isforced to use more and more brutal methods. The occupied people, too, become more and morebrutal. Human life becomes cheap, the borderline between fighters and non-fighters becomesblurred and disappears.
Second: The axis itself.
When the Gaza Strip was turned over to the Palestinian Authority, the Israeli generalsdemanded that there be no border between the Palestinian area and Egypt. The Rafah bordercrossing remained under Israeli control. The “Philadelphi” axis (I have no idea why it was sonamed) was designed to create the separation all along the border.
In order to guard the axis, a strip six kilometers long and one hundred meters wide, soldiersmust pass only dozens of meters away from the Palestinian neighborhoods, which are among themost densely populated in the world.
In times of peace, that is a problematical situation. In times of conflict, this becomes apressure cooker liable to explode at any moment.
Third: the Sharon-Ben-Eliezer government.
The “political leadership” consists of two generals, whose sole language is the language offorce – the one is the leader of the Likud, the other is the leader of the Labor party.
The policy of this government is to break by force the resistance of the Palestinian people tothe occupation. It acts according to the typically Israeli maxim: “If force doesn’t work, usemore force.”
It may be that by now the Israeli occupation has become the most brutal of the modern era:millions of people are imprisoned in their homes for weeks and months on end, two thirds of thepopulation have been pushed under the internationally-accepted poverty line, hundreds ofthousands suffer from malnutrition, on the border of starvation – all this in addition toalmost 2000 killed, among them some 400 children.
There is no sign that the Palestinian resistance is about to break. Quite to the contrary.
By orders and hints, the “political leadership” tells the army to use even more brutalmethods, gradually abolishing all limits. To appease international opinion, some tinyrestrictions are lifted, while at the same time much more severe ones are put into place. Inthis game, Shimon Peres, the Nobel hypocrisy prize laureate, plays an central role.
Fourth: the Chief-of-Staff.
Under the military hierarchical system, the Chief-of-Staff is the person solelyresponsible for all the acts and omissions of the IDF.
General Moshe Ya’alon has already made public his extreme right-wing orientation. He hasannounced that any concession to the Palestinians constitutes a “reward for terrorism”. Hehas defined the Palestinian resistance as a “cancerous growth”.
The Chief-of-Staff controls the actions of even the last man in the army. If he resolutelyobjects to certain actions, it will travel with lightning speed through the chain of commandreaching every soldier, and if he encourages certain actions, or closes his eyes, this, too,will be felt instantly. There is no need for written orders. Every commander senses what hissuperior wants, every soldier senses was his commander desires. That’s how the army works.
Fifth: the Area Command chief.
The Commanding Officer of the Southern area and his staff are well familiar with thetopographical realities. They know that if you put tanks into the “Philadelphi” axis, therewill be Palestinians who will open fire. There exists, therefore, a high probability that afire-fight will develop near a densely populated area, and men, women and children will bekilled. That’s what happened this time, too.
(The same thing has happened in other incidents in the Gaza Strip, such as the one a week beforeat neighboring Khan Younis, when 17 Palestinians, including women and children, werekilled. A different topography, similar circumstances, same command.)
Sixth: the brigade commander.
After the fire fight started, the brigade commander ordered the firing of the shells. He knewthat under the circumstances there was no possibility of separating the armed men frombystanders. He acted according to a principle, which seems to have been adopted by the IDF: inorder to “liquidate” one armed man, it is worthwhile killing ten unarmed people. He should nothave ordered the firing of even one shell, much less five.
He acted with the approval of the division commander, who appeared again on television andboasted about the action. Like the commander of the air force, he seems to sleep very well atnight. He has no qualms, no second thoughts, nothing.
Seventh: the tank commander.
A tank commander is supposed to be able to act under pressure and to make decisions under fire.He must have known that under the circumstances, one shell would cause havoc, and much more soseveral, including the murderous “flachette” variety.
The light finger on the trigger is another symptom of the deterioration of the situation andplaces a heavy burden of guilt on the whole chain of command, from the Prime Minister down to thelast soldier. Shooting shells at curfew-breakers, and especially at children throwingstones at heavy tanks, has already become the bane of the West Bank.
The order to shoot shells may have been a “manifestly illegal order”, over which flies “theblack flag of illegality”, which a soldier is obliged to disobey under Israeli law. No soldiercan argue that he “only followed orders”.
I cannot judge if the lives of the soldiers were in danger. Fortunately, no soldier evensuffered a scratch. IDF soldiers are better protected than any soldier in the world. But ifthey were indeed in mortal danger – the responsibility lies with the commanders, whodeliberately put them into this situation.