If Ariel Sharon were to formulate his intentions as an militaryoperations order, like he used to do in the army, instead of hiding thembehind a host of smoke screens, it would look like this:
1. Aims: To bring the Zionist Revolution to its conclusion, by turning all ofEretz-Israel, from the sea to the Jordan river, into a Jewish state, with a minimum of non-Jewish inhabitants (if any at all).
2. Information: The 1948 War of Independence was broken off before achieving itsaim. The State of Israel was established only on 78% of the land, which brought about the removal of only 64% of the Palestinians. In the 1967 Six-Day War we conquered the remaining 22% of the territories, but successive Israeli governments lacked the necessary willpower to conclude the Zionist revolution by annexing the territories and removing the remaining Arab population.
Now a window of opportunity has opened for concluding the job.
Only one super-power (the US) remains; all the other powers (the UN,Europe, Russia and others) have effectively been eliminated.The US is now lending us unlimited and unqualified support. It is tobe hoped that it will continue to do so even when we employ harshmethods in the pursuit of our national aims. Experience shows that evenwhen somebody in the American administration resists theimplementation of our aims, this resistance collapses when faced withour determined stand (Operation ” Defensive Shield ” ). Our control overboth houses of the Congress and our decisive influence on most of theAmerican media guarantee us freedom of action.
3. Methods: Our task will be achieved by the following methods, to be employedsimultaneously: a. Military operations, to break the armed Palestinian resistance. b. Economic pressure, to cause mass Arab emigration from thecountry.
c. Settlement activity, to cut up the territories and prepare them forannexation to Israel.
d. Political action, to break the Palestinian political and socialinstitutions.
4. Implementation: (a) M i l i t a r y operations: These will be conducted incessantly, without long pauses. The whole army, including the reserves, will beemployed for this task, even if this necessitates a weakening of ourpreparedness vis-a-vis the Arab states and limiting training.
The IDF will occupy the Palestinian territories as needed, for long andshort periods, in order to catch, arrest or execute all Palestinianmilitants who could organize resistance to our policy. For this purposethere is no difference between terrorists and political leaders, betweenarmed or civil resistance, between Hamas and Fatah. Maximaldestruction of property will cause deterrence. This will be a repeatedaction, in order to eliminate every new set of leaders as it emerges.
Our actions will necessarily increase the motivation for terrorists toexecute suicide-bombings in Israel. These will provide us – both in thedomestic and the international arena – with reasons for our militaryaction, which will be seen as a response.
The IDF will also assume a central role in exercising economicpressure (as follows).
It must be ensured that no officer who does not wholeheartedly support this task attains a senior position (Chief-of-Staff, officer incharge of regional commands, chief of departments, commander ofdivisions and brigades). For fulfilling a historic mission, hardness andcruelty are needed; there can be no place for bleeding hearts.
(b) E c o n o m i c pressure: Mass expulsion, like in 1948, can beeffected only in a special situation, such as a fully-fledged war or duringan exceptional international event that draws away world attention.Until this eventuality occurs, Palestinians must be induced to leavethe country by economic pressure that makes their life intolerable. Suchpressure will be achieved through closures and blockades that willprevent the movement of merchants and workers, teachers and pupils,doctors and patients. The whole economic life in the territories must begradually brought to a standstill, so that the ability of the heads offamilies to feed their children is effectively destroyed.
IDF actions will enclose the Palestinians in small enclaves, wherethey will receive some kind of limited local autonomy, so as to relieve usof any formal responsibility for their situation.In the prosecution of this policy, international public opinion andinternational aid agencies must be taken into account. From time totime, exceptions must be made to prevent extreme situations fromarising.
(c) S e t t l e m e n t activity: This is a central tool for fulfilling thehistoric task. In spite of the fact that all Israeli governments since 1967have understood this and acted accordingly, the tempo was slow. Whilemore than 30% of Judea and Samaria are part of the town planningareas of the settlements, hardly more than 1% is actually settled. This isan intolerable scandal which must be speedily rectified. All ministriesmust take part in this urgent effort, devoting a considerable part of theirresources to it.
Existing settlements must be enlarged and new ones set up by allpossible means (takeovers after terrorist attacks, new neighborhoodsfar from the existing settlements, etc.) The network of bypass roadsmust be expanded rapidly in order to cut off Palestinians towns andvillages, to annex more land to the settlements and strengthen ourcontrol on the ground. All this must be done according to the existingstrategic plan, which prevents Palestinian territorial continuity andtightens the economic blockade.
For the settlement effort, the economic resources of all ministriesmust be centralized and all other tasks must take second place. Morepeople, including new immigrants, must be encouraged to join thesettlements. If necessary, young couples should be offered villas at zerocost. The flight of the factories from the settlement industrial parks,following threats by the European Community, must be stopped.
The IDF will devote the necessary resources to the protection of thesettlements and the roads leading to them, even if this means calling upthe reserves and ordering a whole battalion to protect one singleisolated settlement.
(d) P o l i t i c a l pressure: Breaking the Palestinian leadership is acentral component of the whole campaign. In order to destroy the abilityof the Palestinians to resist, the central leadership, and especiallyYasser Arafat, who is a unifying symbol and a strong leader, must beeliminated. Therefore, the whole propaganda effort must beconcentrated on Arafat personally. Every Palestinian factor that is readyto fight against Arafat (including Hamas) must be exploited, as well asanti-Arafat utterances by Israeli left-wing extremists. Arafat will bephysically eliminated once the international situation permits.
At the same time, in-fighting between second-row Palestinian leadersmust be encouraged, in order to create a leadership vacuum, such asexisted in 1948.
All these pressures – military, economic, settlement and political –must be increased, until the situation of the Palestinians becomes sointolerable that they prefer to move to Jordan. If a historical opportunityfor mass expulsion should present itself, we shall exploit it rapidly. Theapparatus for this must already be prepared now.
The Israeli Arabs are a special problem, as they have been given (bymistake) Israeli citizenship. The problem demands a creative solution, inaccordance with our main aims.