Were a student to present Professor Shlomo Ben Ami with the paper that was published in his namein the HaAretz supplement (14.9.01), the professor would have handed it back with thecomments: “Grade: 50%. Large holes in the argument. Many internal contradictions. Noconnection between the facts and the conclusions. No support for the main argument. Tryagain!”
The article, presented as an interview, must be read several times before the weaknessesbecome apparent. As it extends over 8 long pages, it can be assumed that most readers weresatisfied glossing over the headlines and the highlighted quotations, phrased likecampaign slogans. Thus Ben Ami further augments the damage that he and Barak wreaked whentheir short and catastrophic political term of office crashed to its end.
From between the lines, scattered unintentionally, emerges a true picture. He says ofhimself and of Barak: “We were not really members of the ‘in-group’ of the left. Neither of uswere members of the peace industry. Neither of us is a true peace industrialist.” His words,ironically intended, can be translated more simply: neither of them knew anything about thePalestinians, the traumas, the historical narrative, the fears and ambitions of thedesignated partner. Ben Ami and Barak shared the staggering audacity to approach thishistorical peace-making task equipped exclusively with ignorance and arrogance – militarybravado in Barak’s case, and intellectual vanity in Ben Ami’s.
The ignorance worked against them as they did not understand the internal code of thePalestinians but were entirely imprisoned in that of ours. Hence they simply did notunderstand the other side. All its positions were incomprehensible and all its actionsunanticipated. Those who understand the Palestinian issue, who have spent long yearsstudying the subject and thousand of hours of personal dialogue, with some degree of empathy,with Palestinians were not surprised by any of the moves made. (Allow me to remind you that Imyself predicted and published in advance most of the steps taken by the Palestinians.)
History and the coming elections
Ben Ami’s main conclusion is: “For Arafat, Oslo was a huge diversion which allowed him toconceal the political pressure and the terrorism he was activating to undermine the very ideaof two countries for two nations.” I would be willing to allocate a substantial prize to anyonewho can find any proof for this assertion in the 8 pages of the Ben Ami article. The
illustrious professor is presenting his personal opinion as a conclusion based on factualevidence. He demonizes the leader of the other nation in a vulgar manner in order to justify hisown monumental failure and shift the burden of blame for this disaster.
It is true that Arafat and Barak are very different, as different from each other as David BenGurion was from Avrum Burg. As the American saying goes: “a statesman thinks of the nextgenerations, a politician thinks of the next elections.” Arafat is a historical leader wholed his people from the brink of total annihilation to the verge of independent statehood(although not yet visible). Barak, as Ben Ami describes him, was persistently preoccupiedwith the coming elections. The third man in the game, Clinton, could not be re-elected but hewas very much concerned about Barak’s re-election and the electoral race of his wife in theworld’s largest Jewish city.
Arafat gave up nothing
Two very crucial facts, which cast a dark shadow on Barak and Ben Ami, are conspicuouslymissing from Ben Ami’s story: (a) Israel refused to fulfill its obligation according to asigned agreement to complete the third phase of the withdrawal, which was supposed toencompass the entire West Bank with the exception of specific military locations, and (b)throughout the negotiation, Barak expanded the settlements and the by-pass roads at afrantic pace. To this the Palestinians response was: “While you are arguing with us about howto sdivide the pizza, you are eating it.”
Ben Ami’s main contention is that at every stage of the negotiation, from Stockholm in thespring of 2000 to Taba at the beginning of 2001, Arafat did not agree to one single compromise.The Israeli side gave and gave, “kvetsch after kvetsch” in the Yiddish of Ben Ami (who was bornin Tangier, Morocco), and Arafat never presented a single proposal of his own. In Ben Ami’swords: “Arafat did not participate in the game.”
This description is not substantiated by the facts that Ben Ami himself presents. The factsshow (a) that Arafat had a clear position throughout the negotiation process and (b) thatArafat made far-reaching compromises beyond this position.
From the start, the Israeli and American approach was based on an erroneous assumption, whichwas the result of not listening to (or underestimating) the other side. They thought ofcompromise in terms of trade: the buyer offers 10 dollars, the seller demands 20 and theycompromise on 15. The buyer (Israel) offered 11, then 12, then 13. The seller (thePalestinians) insisted on 20 and, reluctantly, came down to 19.50. According to Ben Ami, thisis tantamount to proof that he wants to destroy Israel.
The Palestinian interpretation is very different. They made their historical compromise atOslo, when they formally relinquished 78% of their homeland that was captured by the Israelisin 1948, and accepted the remaining 22%. Israel now comes (assisted by the Americans) todemand a compromise on these 22%. For the Palestinians, this is out of the question.
Ben Ami claims that: “they refused to give us any clue regarding the end of their demands…. ablack hole of one demand followed by another demand, with no clear view of the finish line.” Butthe real problem was the hearing difficulty of the professor himself. If only the arrogant duoBarak-Ben Ami had listened to what “this character” (in Barak’s words) repeated over andover, they would have known there was a very clear finish line. It had been on the table all thetime: the establishment of a Palestinian State in all the occupied territories beyond thegreen line and the achievement of a true peace between Israel and Palestine. We heard thisposition hundreds of times over the years. There is no shred of evidence to refute itssincerity. It is stable and solid, as opposed to the infinite series of sophistries producedby Ben Ami and Beilin that were designed as “new offers”.
As an aside, if there were any truth to the stock Israeli assertion that the Palestiniansemploy the “slice method” (take what is offered and ask for more, until Israel is destroyed)then Arafat surely would have grabbed Barak’s “generous offer” in both hands and left thedemand for more to his heirs. The fact that Arafat turned down the offers proves his sincerity.He regarded the agreement as “the end of the conflict” and therefore required the minimumnecessary for the Palestinians to establish an independent State. It was precisely thisinsistence by the Palestinians, that so infuriated Ben Ami, which demonstrates theirwillingness to recognize Israel and end the conflict.
Even according to Ben Ami, Arafat did in fact make some far-reaching compromises from thePalestinian perspective. Among these:
1 – He agreed to changes in the green line and to the annexation of 2% – 3.5% to Israel.
2 – He agreed theoretically to settlement blocs, which are an anathema to thePalestinians.
3 – He agreed to the annexation to Israel of Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, whichfor Palestinians are, in every respect, settlements set up in land taken by Israel in1967.
4 – He agreed to hand over to Israel the Western Wall and the Jewish quarter in the Old City.
5 – He agreed to relinquish the historical claim of the refugees to return to their homesand accepted, in principle, that Israel will only allow the return of an agreed-uponlimited number.
Anyone who knows even a little about the Palestinian subject knows that these are enormouscompromises. How can this be reconciled with the conclusion that they want to destroy Israel?
Camp David: Deranged Behavior
And now for the facts, (I am not comparing Ben Ami’s description with those of thePalestinians, but relying solely on Ben Ami’s own description):
When Barak set forth early in 2001, he offered the Palestinians 65% of the territories (whichrepresent 14.5% of mandatory Eretz Israel).
In the spring of 2000, when the negotiations began in Stockholm, the Israelis demanded 12% ofthe territories (with no land swap) in addition to “security holdings” in the Jordan Valley(effectively an annexation of an additional 10%) and Israeli control over the Jordan riverborder area (effectively cutting off the West Bank from Jordan). Barak objected to anydiscussion of Jerusalem and refused to even mention Jerusalem as a topic of discussion. Therefined Abu-Ala said to Ben Ami: “Shlomo, take the maps back.”
The next stage was Camp David in July 2000. From Robert Malley, Clinton’s aide, we know thatArafat was coerced against his will to attend. He believed (correctly) that he was walkinginto a trap. Barak and Clinton were like the two arms of a nutcracker who intended to crack himopen (as I wrote at the time). Arafat’s sole purpose was to emerge unscathed and whole. Barak,whose government had already begun to fall apart, intended to force Arafat into an agreementthat would help him get reelected. Clinton wanted to reward his long-suffering wife withJewish votes for her election to the senate.
The Israelis placed the map of 12% annexation on the table. Orally they hinted that they wouldbe willing to accept 8 – 10%, in addition to their claim of “temporary” control over the JordanValley. The Palestinians had already learned the value of oral promises from the “thirdwithdrawal” that has, to this date, not been carried out.
Gradually Jerusalem surfaced as a central topic. Barak’s offer was very different from theimpression created in Israel. He was willing to grant the Palestinians control only on the”outer rim” (Abu-Dis, which he had previously promised to hand over but never did,El-Azariah, Beit-Hanina etc.). But he intended to keep the Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalemproper (Sheikh-Jarah, Abu-Joz, Ras-El-Amud, Silwan etc.) under Israeli sovereignty,handing over only “functional autonomy” to the Palestinians. He was ready to grant thePalestinians “permanent guardianship” of the Temple Mount but insisted that Israel retainsovereignty over it. No Arab or Muslim leader in the world could have accepted such a”generous” offer.
The accounts of percentages (of annexation) do not tell the true story. More important thanthe number of dunams, was their location. The Israeli map effectively chopped up the West Bankinto three unconnected enclaves, each one surrounded by settlements and soldiers. Thefragile territorial continuity shown in the map does not change this reality.
When the Palestinians rejected this offer, Barak sank into a deep depression – according toBen Ami. For two days he did not even speak to any of his aides. During a formal dinner he sat stiff”like a pillar of salt”. He avoided Arafat throughout the conference. Anyone who knows Arafatthe man, knows that personal contact is very important to him. This may not have changed thesubstance of the talks but it could have prevented avoidable crises. Barak’s refusal to talkto him directly and to acknowledge him at official dinners, certainly confirmed his worstsuspicions. Ben Ami attributes this deranged behavior of Barak to “Cartesian logic” (purelogic, named after the French philosopher Rene Descartes). Arafat, being only a simple Arab,could not aspire to such an elevated quality. “They (the Palestinians) lacked the greatnessthat was in Ehud”, enthused the professor.
Ben Ami’s descriptions are replete with psychological reflections about Arafat as heappears in the imagination of this professor of modern Spanish history. Anyone who knowsArafat knows there is no similarity between “this character” and the real man. Ben Ami simplyhas no clue. It appears that the students of Descartes could not cross the cultural gap andsimply could not understand the language of the Arab leader. This phenomenon is known also inrelations between Americans and Japanese, for one example. When Arafat politely indicatedrefusal, in a language that would be clear to any Arab, they understood that he had accepted andwere shocked to discover the following day that the answer was “no”.
Ben Ami’s ignorance reaches a climax when he says “at that moment (the moment does not matter) Iunderstood that they (the Palestinians) were not Sadat”. Sadat? The Egyptian leaderdemanded and received every last inch of his territories, with all the settlements in itdismantled, including the town of Yamit. He would never have agreed to the kind of compromisesmade by Arafat.
Taba: the last alibi
After Camp David exploded over what seemed to the Palestinians to be the humiliating offers ofBarak and his total disregard for the far-reaching compromises they had made and brought tothe table, the Intifada broke out. This completely changed the rules of the game.Nevertheless Clinton presented his own plan. He had less than one full month in office and noway to ensure that the Israelis would keep their side of his offer.
What did he offer? Annexation to Israel of 2% – 3% of the West Bank in exchange for Israeliterritory equal to 1% of the West Bank. Alternatively, annexation of 6% to Israel in exchangefor 3%. Division of Jerusalem: all that is Jewish – to Israel, all that is Arab – to Palestine.The Temple Mount to Palestine, the Western Wall and the Holy of Holies (in other words, part ofthe Temple Mount) to Israel. A minimal number of refugees to return to Israel, “in accordancewith the Israeli Law”. Military control in the Jordan Valley for three years, militarypresence for an additional three years.
Both sides submitted several pages of reservations. With great verbal agility, Ben Amiclaims that the Palestinians effectively rejected the offer and the Israelis actuallyaccepted it. Nothing of the kind! Barak persisted in his entirely unacceptable demands thatthe West Bank be cut off from Jordan and that Israel have a degree of sovereign control over theTemple Mount. The Palestinians, of course, rejected the idea of “Holy of Holies” andsubmitted their own demands.
Then there was Taba. This is Ben Ami’s last alibi. The myth of “Barak’s generous offers” wasexposed following the disclosures of the American Robert Malley and others. A new myth wasborn: although no “generous offers” were made at Camp David, at Taba the Palestinians wereoffered everything, and they refused. This proves that…. etc.
At Taba there was, indeed, significant progress. It was agreed in principle that the number ofrefugees allowed to return to Israel would be limited by an agreement. This was a verysignificant Palestinian and Israeli compromise. What remained was the argument over thenumbers: the Palestinians opened the negotiations at 150 thousand per year for ten years.According to Ben Ami,Yossi Beilin offered 40 thousand (per year? In total?). The Israelidelegation presented a new map with an annexation of 5.5% to Israel. The settlement blocs werereduced in size and the topic of a swap of territories was raised. Locations were notdiscussed.
For the first time, Ben Ami confessed, the Palestinians presented a counter-map, whichrelinquished 2.34% and left the large settlements and the bypass roads to them in Israel, butwithout the Palestinian villages around them.
The Palestinians already knew at this stage that there was no support for the Israeli offer aselections were to take place in Israel in a few days and, according to all the polls, Barak wasabout to suffer a colossal defeat. But they did not reject the Israeli offers, as Ben Amiclaims. On the contrary, since then they insist that every negotiation begin at the point thatTaba ended.
Ben Ami does not take the trouble to remind his readers how the negotiations at Taba ended:Barak instructed that they end and that all offers be retracted. This fact does not preventBarak s, ever since, that he turned over every stone and offered everything while the wickedArafat responded with war.
The road to Hell and good intentions
The road to Hell is sometimes paved with good intentions. There is no doubt that Ben Ami had goodintentions but he led us to the current hell.
To cover up his awful failure, he created the legend that there is no one to speak to, that thePalestinians intend to destroy Israel, that “for them the negotiation ends only when Israelcollapses.” This is said while Israel uses brutal oppressive force in the occupiedterritories, kills Palestinian activists and refuses to freeze the settlements.
Ben Ami’s term as Minister of Police gave us the October 2000 catastrophe (when police killed11 Arab citizens), which ruined, possibly for generations to come, the good relationsbetween Jews and Arabs in Israel. His short term as Foreign Minister ended in disaster thatdestroyed large sections of the Israeli peace camp and guaranteed the election of Sharon.
Such results might lead another man to regretful contemplation and to a measure of humility.Not Ben Ami who in his own eyes is a political genius.
The editor gave the interview with him the title “The Day the Peace Died”. It should have beencalled “The Day We Killed the Peace”.