Concerning the Duvdevan affair, all the questions have already been asked, except theimportant ones.
(Duvdevan, Hebrew for cherry, is the code-name of an undercover Israeli army unit used inPalestinian surroundings, usually masquerading as Arabs. In a recent action, three of itssoldiers were accidentally killed by their own comrades in the Palestinian village Assiraal-Shmalieh while trying to capture and/or kill a “wanted” Hamas fighter, MahmoudAbu-Hunud. He escaped. In another action, a 72 years old Palestinian, who mistook the Israelisoldiers for thieves and opened fire, was also killed.)
The important questions are:
- What would have happened if the Assira action had succeeded?
- Why did Ehud Barak approve this action and the one before, in which an old Palestinian was killed?
- Why was this unit not disbanded long ago?
The answer to the first question is frightening. When Mossad agents failed to kill the Hamas leader in the bungled action in Amman, it was the failure which saved us from catastrophe, the very catastrophe which befell us when the Security Service succeeded in killing the Hamas fighter Yikhye Ayash, nicknamed “the engineer”.
That so-called “success” buried Shim’on Peres, the then Prime Minister. In a series ofrevenge actions, dozens of Israelis were killed, Benjamin Netanyahu was swept into power andpeace was postponed.
If Abu-Hunud, had been killed, the same thing would have happened: A series of terroristactions, dozens killed, the return of the Likud to power, the end of Barak’s career.
For a year and a half we have had quiet. It is not the Cherries who have achieved this, but YasserArafat. He has succeeded because the majority of Palestinians realize that terrorist acts atthis time will damage their cause. Palestinian public opinion prevents Hamas actions. But ifAbu-Hunud had been killed, he would have become a folk hero and the Palestinians would havecried out for revenge.
However, the action failed. Abu-Hunud escaped and turned himself in to the Palestinianpolice. Everybody is satisfied. So why did Barak not let the Palestinians arrest him in thefirst place?
The answer to the other two questions is even more disturbing. Barak talks about peace.According to him, we could have peace tomorrow morning, if only Arafat was more forthcoming.The invasion of a village under (civilian) Palestinian rule by an Israeli army unit will mostcertainly not push Arafat in this direction. On the contrary, there will be more publicpressure on him not to give in to Barak’s demands.
There must be some method in this madness. After all, Barak is a logical person.
There is indeed a logical explanation for the continued existence of units like Duvdevan andthe extension of their activity, some (if not all) of which are training exercises – afrightening explanation. These are preparations for the forthcoming big militaryconfrontation that is bound to occur if the peace process finally breaks down. It is quitepossible that the four victims of the Duvdevan actions – the old Palestinian and the threesoldiers – will in future be considered the first victims of the next Israeli-Palestinianwar.
What will this war be like?
Let’s look at a possible scenario:
The Palestinians will declare their state on the West Bank and in the Gaza trip, with EastJerusalem as its capital.
In retaliation, Israel will declare the annexation of the settlements.
Crowds of unarmed Palestinians will march on some of the isolated settlements.
The Israeli army will send in large reinforcements, in addition to the tanks alreadystationed there.
Somebody (probably a settler) will open fire.
All over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, fights will break out between the Israeli army and the40 thousand Palestinian soldiers, who will be joined by a 100 thousand armed Fatah youth andall the other Palestinian organizations. Hundreds of Palestinians and dozens of Israeliswill be killed.
As some Israeli generals have already speculated in public, attack helicopters will be sentinto action.
At this stage, Barak will have to decide whether to send the army into the Palestinian towns.
If he does, there will be street-battles, in which the tanks will be met by Hamas suicidebombers and Fatah fighters, who might succeed in destroying some of them. (In 1976, a Syriantank column, which entered Sidon in order to destroy the PLO forces there, was nearlyannihilated.)
Casualties (mostly Palestinians) will probably be numbered in thousands.
Perhaps Barak will not involve the army in fighting of this kind. Instead, he might decide toblockade the Palestinian towns and villages, hoping to beat them into submission throughstarvation.
Palestinians will try to break out by force. Again, there will be hundreds of casualties.
The Palestinians, fighting for their national existence, will be willing to absorb manycasualties. How many casualties will the Israeli public be ready to sustain in such a war? Whenthe UN finally intervenes and declares a cease-fire, the Israeli public will be glad to acceptit.
What next?
Both sides will return to where they are now, both will be wiser. Our side, too. We shall thenmake the concessions necessary for peace, which Barak is not ready to make today.
Only, the dead will not be there to see.