What kind of logic leads soldiers into a trap? It happened once before.They called it the “Bar-Lev Line.” Almost by chance, without any priorstrategic planning or any official decision, a line of fortifications wasestablished along the Suez Canal. Israel Tal, Ariel Sharon, MatityahuPeled, and yours truly, had decried this folly, to no avail. Hundreds ofsoldiers paid for it with their lives.
Now the same pattern continues in Lebanon. The price tag for this follyis growing. Like the Bar-Lev Line, this one also began without anyparticular forethought. During Rabin’s first government, Defense MinisterShimon Peres picked a Christian-Lebanese army Major, one Sa’ad Haddad, andgave him an “enclave” on Lebanese soil, so that he would defend ournorthern border. It seemed like a brilliant move. A bit of methodicalthinking would have demonstrated that it was bound to lead to disaster.
Note: Once the Lebanese border was Israel’s quietest border, virtually aborder of peace. In the mid forties I once hiked alone from Kfar Gil’adito Misgav-Am, suddenly finding myself on an unfamiliar road. A politeLebanese gendarme approached me and showed me the way back to Palestine(as it was at the time).
All this obviously changed when the PLO organizations wereexpelled from Jordan during Black September (1970), and got afoothold in Southern Lebanon. The border became the scene of fierceguerilla fighting, but the Lebanese population was not involved. In fact,this population strenuously objected to the presence of the Palestinians.This was amply demonstrated when this population — of Shi’ites, yet! –welcomed the IDF with hoots of joy and handfuls of rice at the onset ofthe war with Lebanon. The Shi’ites believed that the IDF would get rid ofthe Palestinians and then go back home.
But the IDF did not go back home. After a few months, a new kind ofguerilla war began. Those submissive Shi’ites, who for centuries had beendowntrodden, suddenly turned into fierce lions, fighting the Israeliinvader. Much blood was shed before our military and political leadershipdecided in 1984 to “put their tail between their legs” (yes, Mr.Netanyahu, this is the right expression) and get out.
But not altogether. Shimon Peres, the head of the unity government at thetime, was reminded of Major Haddad, and decided to repeat the move on alarge scale. Once again there was a “Security Zone.” And so began theunavoidable dance macabre. The Shi’ites stood up to defend theirhomeland. The Syrians and the Iranians discovered that this state ofaffairs was actually dove-tailing with their own goals, and beganproviding help. South Lebanon had become Israel’s Vietnam.
There is no way in the world to win a guerilla war, whose fighters view itas a war of liberation against a foreign occupier and its localcollaborators. The only way is to disengage and get out. The sooner thebetter.
There are those who say: it won’t work without Syria. But Syria isusing the Hizbollah to pressure Israel to return the Golan Heights. Wecould gain Syria’s support only if we decided to give back the entireGolan. If Netanyahu and his partners are prepared to pay this price –fine. If not, they should stop this nonsense about Syrian consent. Itjust won’t happen.
There are those who say: But we need a Lebanese partner. This, too, isnonsense. Lebanon is now practically part of Syria, as it has beenthroughout most of its history. Without Syrian consent, there will be noLebanese consent.
There are those who say: If we get out of Lebanon, the guerillas willfollow us and will endanger Israeli territory. There is no evidence tosupport such a claim. The Hizbollah is not a Syrian agent. It is aLebanese party, and its goal is to turn Lebanon into an Islamic republic,patterned after Iran. It has no interest to act within Israel.
But, for the sake of argument, and in the face of all logic — let usassume for a moment that the Hizbollah movement, under Iranian and Syrianpressure, will try, after all, to continue fighting us. With such ascenario, the situation would still be much better for Israel. In orderto conduct such warfare, they would need the support of the localpopulation. This population is now supporting a war against a foreigninvader. It would not support a war across its borders, which could, infact, endanger it. In other words: The Hizbollah would be considerablyweakened, and its activity against Israel would be rendered negligible. Itwould be a whole lot cheaper to fight the Hizbollah from within our ownterritory.
Logic dictates: Get out, and promptly. Every brave officer must stand upand say this out loud. But brave officers are not exactly an easy-to-findcommodity. The garden-variety officer knows that his career depends onpoliticians. Why should he antagonize them? And why should thegarden-variety politician, for instance, Yitzhak Mordechai, say somethingwhich would be objectionable to his party’s leader?
Evidently, only the soldiers’ mothers, who are ready to demonstrate thenecessary courage and determination, can force the leadership to cease anddesist from this lethal folly.