Introduction
This EU non-paper has been prepared by the EU Special Representative to theMiddle East Process, Ambassador Moratinos, and his team after consultationswith the Israeli and Palestinian sides, present at Taba in January 2001. Althoughthe paper has no official status, it has been acknowledged by the parties as being arelatively fair description of the outcome of the negotiations on the permanent statusissues at Taba. It draws attention to the extensive work which has been undertakenon all permanent status issues like territory, Jerusalem, refugees and security inorder to find ways to come to joint positions. At the same time it shows that thereare serious gaps and differences between the two sides, which will have to beovercome in future negotiations. From that point of view, the paper reveals thechallenging task ahead in terms of policy determination and legal work, but it alsoshows that both sides have traveled a long way to accommodate the views of theother side and that solutions are possible.
Territory
The two sides agreed that in accordance with the UN Security CouncilResolution 242, the June 4 1967 lines would be the basis for the bordersbetween Israel and the state of Palestine.
West Bank
For the first time both sides presented their own maps over the West Bank.The maps served as a basis for the discussion on territory and settlements. TheIsraeli side presented two maps, and the Palestinian side engaged on this basis.The Palestinian side presented some illustrative maps detailing its understandingof Israeli interests in the West Bank.
The negotiations tackled the various aspects of territory, whichcould include some of the settlements and how the needs of eachparty could be accommodated. The Clinton parameters served asa loose basis for the discussion, but differences of interpretationsregarding the scope and meaning of the parameters emerged. ThePalestinian side stated that it had accepted the Clinton proposalsbut with reservations.
The Israeli side stated that the Clinton proposals provide forannexation of settlement blocs. The Palestinian side did not agreethat the parameters included blocs, and did not accept proposalsto annex blocs. The Palestinian side stated that blocs would causesignificant harm to the Palestinian interests and rights, particularly tothe Palestinians residing in areas Israel seeks to annex.
The Israeli side maintained that it is entitled to contiguity betweenand among their settlements. The Palestinian side stated thatPalestinian needs take priority over settlements. The Israeli mapsincluded plans for future development of Israeli settlements in theWest Bank. The Palestinian side did not agree to the principle ofallowing further development of settlements in the West Bank. Anygrowth must occur inside Israel.
The Palestinian side maintained that since Israel has needs inPalestinian territory, it is responsible for proposing the necessaryborder modifications. The Palestinian side reiterated that suchproposals must not adversely affect the Palestinian needs andinterests.
The Israeli side stated that it did not need to maintain settlements inthe Jordan Valley for security purposes, and its proposed mapsreflected this position.The Israeli maps were principally based on a demographic conceptof settlements blocs that would incorporate approximately 80percent on the settlers. The Israeli side sketched a map presentinga 6 percent annexation, the outer limit of the Clinton proposal. ThePalestinian illustrative map presented 3.1 percent in the context of aland swap.
Both sides accepted the principle of land swap but theproportionality of the swap remained under discussion. Both sidesagreed that Israeli and Palestinian sovereign areas will haverespective sovereign contiguity. The Israeli side wished to count”assets” such as Israelis “safe passage/corridor” proposal as beingpart of the land swap, even though the proposal would not givePalestine sovereignty over these “assets”. The Israeli side adheredto a maximum 3 percent land swap as per Clinton proposal.The Palestinian maps had a similar conceptual point of referencestressing the importance of a non-annexation of any Palestinianvillages and the contiguity of the West Bank and Jerusalem. Theywere predicated on the principle of a land swap that would beequitable in size and value and in areas adjacent to the border withPalestine, and in the same vicinity as the annexed by Israel. ThePalestinian side further maintained that land not under Palestiniansovereignty such as the Israeli proposal regarding a “safepassage/corridor” as well as economic interests are not included inthe calculation of the swap.
The Palestinian side maintained that the “No-Man’s-Land” (Latrunarea) is part of the West Bank. The Israelis did not agree.The Israeli side requested and additional 2 percent of land under alease arrangement to which the Palestinians responded that thesubject of lease can only be discussed after the establishment of aPalestinian state and the transfer of land to Palestinian sovereignty.
Gaza Strip
Neither side presented any maps over the Gaza Strip. In was implied that theGaza Strip will be under total Palestinian sovereignty, but details have still to beworked out. All settlements will be evacuated. The Palestinian side claimed itcould be arranged in 6 months, a timetable not agreed by the Israeli side.Safepassage/corridor from Gaza to the West Bank_Both sides agreed that there is going to be a safe passage from the north ofGaza (Beit Hanun) to the Hebron district, and that the West Bank and theGaza Strip must be territorially linked. The nature of the regime governing theterritorial link and sovereignty over it was not agreed.Jerusalem
Sovereignty
Both sides accepted in principle the Clinton suggestion of having a Palestiniansovereignty over Arab neighborhoods and an Israeli sovereignty over Jewishneighborhoods. The Palestinian side affirmed that it was ready to discuss Israelirequest to have sovereignty over those Jewish settlements in East Jerusalemthat were constructed after 1967, but not Jebal Abu Ghneim and Ras al-Amud. The Palestinian side rejected Israeli sovereignty over settlements in theJerusalem Metropolitan Area, namely of Ma’ale Adumim and Givat Ze’ev.The Palestinian side understood that Israel was ready to acceptPalestinian sovereignty over the Arab neighborhoods of EastJerusalem, including part of Jerusalem’s Old City. The Israeli sideunderstood that the Palestinians were ready to accept Israelisovereignty over the Jewish Quarter of the Old City and part of theArmenian Quarter.
The Palestinian side understood that the Israeli side accepted todiscuss Palestinian property claims in West Jerusalem.
Open City
Both sides favored the idea of an Open City. The Israeli side suggested theestablishment of an open city whose geographical scope encompasses the OldCity of Jerusalem plus an area defined as the Holy Basin or Historical Basin.The Palestinian side was in favor of an open city provided thatcontinuity and contiguity were preserved. The Palestinians rejectedthe Israeli proposal regarding the geographic scope of an open cityand asserted that the open city is only acceptable if its geographicalscope encompasses the full municipal borders of both East andWest Jerusalem.
The Israeli side raised the idea of establishing a mechanism of dailycoordination and different models were suggested for municipalcoordination and cooperation (dealing with infrastructure, roads,electricity, sewage, waste removal etc). Such arrangements couldbe formulated in a future detailed agreement. It proposed a “softborder regime” within Jerusalem between Al-Quds andYerushalaim that affords them “soft border” privileges. Furthermorethe Israeli side proposed a number of special arrangements forPalestinian and Israeli residents of the Open City to guarantee thatthe Open City arrangement neiadversely affect their daily livesnor compromise each party sovereignty over its section of theOpen City.
Capital for two states
The Israeli side accepted that the City of Jerusalem would be the capital of thetwo states: Yerushalaim, capital of Israel and Al-Quds, capital of the state ofPalestine. The Palestinian side expressed its only concern, namely that EastJerusalem is the capital of the state of Palestine.
Holy/Historical Basin and the Old City
There was an attempt to develop an alternative concept that would relate to theOld City and its surroundings, and the Israeli side put forward severalalternative models for discussion, for example, setting up a mechanism for closecoordination and cooperation in the Old City. The idea of a special policeforce regime was discussed but not agreed upon.The Israeli side expressed its interest and raised its concernregarding the area conceptualized as the Holy Basin (whichincludes the Jewish Cemetery on the Mount of Olives, the City ofDavid and Kivron Valley). The Palestinian side confirmed that itwas willing to take into account Israeli interests and concernsprovided that these places remain under Palestinian sovereignty.Another option for the Holy Basin, suggested informally by theIsraeli side, was to create a special regime or to suggest some formof internationalization for the entire area or a joint regime withspecial cooperation and coordination. The Palestinian side did notagree to pursue any of these ideas, although the discussion couldcontinue.
Holy Sites: Western Wall and the Wailing Wall
Both parties have accepted the principle of respective control over each side’srespective holy sites (religious control and management). According to thisprinciple, Israel’s sovereignty over the Western Wall would be recognizedalthough there remained a dispute regarding the delineation of the area coveredby the Western Wall and especially the link to what is referred to in Clinton’sideas as the space sacred to Judaism of which it is part.The Palestinian side acknowledged that Israel has requested toestablish an affiliation to the holy parts of the Western Wall, butmaintained that the question of the Wailing Wall and/or WesternWall has not been resolved. It maintained the importance ofdistinguishing between the Western Wall and the Wailing Wallsegment thereof, recognized in the Islamic faith as the Buraq Wall.
Haramal-Sharif/Temple Mount
Both sides agreed that the question of Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount has notbeen resolved. However, both sides were close to accepting Clinton’s ideasregarding Palestinian sovereignty over Haram al-Sharif notwithstandingPalestinian and Israeli reservations.
Both sides noted progress on practical arrangements regardingevacuations, building and public order in the area of the compound.An informal suggestion was raised that for an agreed period suchas three years, Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount would be underinternational sovereignty of the P5 plus Morocco (or other Islamicpresence), whereby the Palestinians would be the”Guardian/Custodians” during this period. At the end of this period,either the parties would agree on a new solution or agree to extendthe existing arrangement. In the absence of an agreement, theparties would return to implement the Clinton formulation. Neitherparty accepted or rejected the suggestion.
Refugees
Non-papers were exchanged, which were regarded as a good basis for thetalks. Both sides stated that the issue of the Palestinian refugees is centralto the Israeli-Palestinian relations and that a comprehensive and justsolution is essential to creating a lasting and morally scrupulous peace. Bothsides agreed to adopt the principles and references with could facilitate theadoption of an agreement.
Both sides suggested, as a basis, that the parties should agree that a justsettlement of the refugee problem in accordance with the UN SecurityCouncil Resolution 242 must lead to the implementation of UN GeneralAssembly Resolution 194.
Narrative
The Israeli side put forward a suggested joint narrative for the tragedy of thePalestinian refugees. The Palestinian side discussed the proposed narrative andthere was much progress, although no agreement was reached in an attempt todevelop and historical narrative in the general text.Return,repatriation and relocation and rehabilitation_Both sides engaged in a discussion of the practicalities of resolving the refugeeissue. The Palestinian side reiterated that the Palestinian refugees should havethe right of return to their homes in accordance with the interpretation ofUNGAR 194. The Israeli side expressed its understanding that the wish toreturn as per wording of UNGAR 194 shall be implemented within theframework of one of the following programs:
A. Return and repatriation to Israel, to Israel swapped territory, tothe Palestine state.
B. Rehabilitation in host country, Relocation to third country.Preference in all these programs shall be accorded to thePalestinian refugee population in Lebanon. The Palestinian sidestressed that the above shall be subject to the individual free choiceof the refugees, and shall not prejudice their right to their homes inaccordance with its interpretation of UNGAR 194.
The Israeli side, informally, suggested a three-track 15-yearabsorption program, which was discussed but not agreed upon.The first track referred to the absorption to Israel. No numberswere agreed upon, but with a non-paper referring to 25,000 in thefirst three years of this program (40,000 in the first five years of thisprogram did not appear in the non-paper but was raised verbally).The second track referred to the absorption of Palestinian refugeesinto the Israeli territory, that shall be transferred to Palestiniansovereignty, and the third track referring to the absorption ofrefugees in the context of family reunification scheme.The Palestinian side did not present a number, but stated that thenegotiations could not start without an Israeli opening position. Itmaintained that Israel’s acceptance of the return of refugees shouldnot prejudice existing programs within Israel such as familyreunification.
Compensation
Both sides agreed to the establishment of an International Commission and anInternational Fund as a mechanism for dealing with compensation in all itsaspects. Both sides agreed that “small-sum” compensation shall be paid to therefugees in the “fast-track” procedure, claims of compensation for propertylosses below certain amount shall be subject to “fast-track” procedures.There was also progress on Israeli compensation for materiallosses, land and assets expropriated, including agreement on apayment from an Israeli lump sum or proper amount to be agreedupon that would feed into the International Fund. According to theIsraeli side the calculation of this payment would be based on amacro-economic survey to evaluate the assets in order to reach afair value. The Palestinian side, however, said that this sum wouldbe calculated on the records of the UNCCP, the Custodian forAbsentee Property and other relevant data with a multiplier toreach a fair value.
UNRWA
Both sides agreed that UNRWA should be phased out in accordance with anagreed timetable of five years, as a targeted period. The Palestinian side addeda possible adjustment of that period to make sure that this will be subject to theimplementation of the other aspects of the agreement dealing with refugees, andwith termination of Palestinian refugee status in the various locations.
Former Jewish refugees
The Israeli side requested that the issue of compensation to former Jewishrefugees from Arab countries be recognized, while accepting that it was not aPalestinian responsibility or a bilateral issue. The Palestinian side maintainedthat this is not a subject for a bilateral Palestinian-Israeli agreement.
Restitution
The Palestinian side raised the issue of restitution of refugee property. TheIsraeli side rejected this.Endof claims_issue of the end of claims was discussed, and it was suggested that theimplementation of the agreement shall constitute a complete and finalimplementation of UNGAR 194 and therefore ends all claims.Security
Early warning stations
The Israeli side requested to have 3 early warning stations on Palestinianterritory. The Palestinian side was prepared to accept the continued operationsof early warning stations but subject to certain conditions. The exactmechanism has therefore to be detailed in further negotiations.Militarycapability of the state of Palestine_The Israeli side maintained that the state of Palestine would be non-militarizedas per the Clinton proposals. The Palestinian side was prepared to acceptlimitation on its acquisition of arms, and be defined as a state with limited arms.The two sides have not yet agreed on the scope of arms limitations, but havebegun exploring different options. Both sides agree that this issue has not beenconcluded.
Air space control
The two sides recognized that the state of Palestine would have sovereigntyover its airspace. The Israeli side agreed to accept and honor all of Palestinecivil aviation rights according to international regulations, but sought a unified aircontrol system under overriding Israel control. In addition, Israel requestedaccess to Palestinian airspace for military operations and training.The Palestinian side was interested in exploring models for broadcooperation and coordination in the civil aviation sphere, butunwilling to cede overriding control to Israel. As for Israeli militaryoperations and training in Palestinian airspace, the Palestinian siderejected this request as inconsistent with the neutrality of the stateof Palestine, saying that it cannot grant Israel these privileges whiledenying them to its Arab neighbors.
Timetable for withdrawal from the West Bank and Jordan Valley_Based on the Clinton proposal, the Israeli side agreed to a withdrawal from theWest Bank over a 36-month period with an additional 36 months for theJordan Valley in conjunction with an international force, maintaining that adistinction should be made between withdrawal in the Jordan Valley andelsewhere.
The Palestinian side rejected a 36-month withdrawal process fromthe West Bank expressing concern that a lengthy process wouldexacerbate Palestinian-Israeli tensions. The Palestinian sideproposed an 18 months withdrawal under the supervision ofinternational forces. As to the Jordan Valley the Palestinian sidewas prepared to consider the withdrawal of Israeli armed forcesfor an additional 10-month period. Although the Palestinian sidewas ready to consider the presence of international forces in the
West Bank for a longer period, it refused to accept the ongoingpresence of Israeli forces.
Emergency deployment (or emergency locations)
The Israeli side requested to maintain and operate five emergency locations onPalestinian territory (in the Jordan Valley) with the Palestinian responseallowing for maximum of two emergency locations conditional on a time limitfor the dismantling. In addition, the Palestinian side considered that these twoemergency locations be run by international presence and not by the Israelis.Informally, the Israeli side expressed willingness to explore ways that amultinational presence could provide a vehicle for addressing the parties’respective concerns.
The Palestinian side declined to agree to the deployment of Israeliarmed forces on Palestinian territory during emergency situations,but was prepared to consider ways in which international forcesmight be used in that capacity, particularly within the context ofregional security cooperation efforts.
Security cooperation and fighting terror
Both sides were prepared to commit themselves to promoting securitycooperation and fighting terror.
Borders and international crossings
The Palestinian side was confident that Palestinian sovereignty overborders and international crossing points would be recognized inthe agreement. The two sides had, however, not yet resolved thisissue including the question of monitoring and verification atPalestine’s international borders (Israeli or international presence).
Electromagnetic sphere
The Israeli side recognized that the state of Palestine would have sovereigntyover the electromagnetic sphere, and acknowledged that it would not seek toconstrain Palestinian commercial use of the sphere, but sought control over itfor security purposes.
The Palestinian side sought full sovereign rights over theelectromagnetic sphere, but was prepared to accommodatereasonable Israeli needs within a cooperative framework inaccordance with international rules and regulations.