EU description of the outcome of permanent status talks at Taba
Introduction_
This EU non-paper has been prepared by the EU Special Representative to the
Middle East Process, Ambassador Moratinos, and his team after consultations
with the Israeli and Palestinian sides, present at Taba in January 2001. Although
the paper has no official status, it has been acknowledged by the parties as being a
relatively fair description of the outcome of the negotiations on the permanent status
issues at Taba. It draws attention to the extensive work which has been undertaken
on all permanent status issues like territory, Jerusalem, refugees and security in
order to find ways to come to joint positions. At the same time it shows that there
are serious gaps and differences between the two sides, which will have to be
overcome in future negotiations. From that point of view, the paper reveals the
challenging task ahead in terms of policy determination and legal work, but it also
shows that both sides have traveled a long way to accommodate the views of the
other side and that solutions are possible.
Territory_
The two sides agreed that in accordance with the UN Security Council
Resolution 242, the June 4 1967 lines would be the basis for the borders
between Israel and the state of Palestine.
WestBank_
For the first time both sides presented their own maps over the West Bank.
The maps served as a basis for the discussion on territory and settlements. The
Israeli side presented two maps, and the Palestinian side engaged on this basis.
The Palestinian side presented some illustrative maps detailing its understanding
of Israeli interests in the West Bank.
The negotiations tackled the various aspects of territory, which
could include some of the settlements and how the needs of each
party could be accommodated. The Clinton parameters served as
a loose basis for the discussion, but differences of interpretations
regarding the scope and meaning of the parameters emerged. The
Palestinian side stated that it had accepted the Clinton proposals
but with reservations.
The Israeli side stated that the Clinton proposals provide for
annexation of settlement blocs. The Palestinian side did not agree
that the parameters included blocs, and did not accept proposals
to annex blocs. The Palestinian side stated that blocs would cause
significant harm to the Palestinian interests and rights, particularly to
the Palestinians residing in areas Israel seeks to annex.
The Israeli side maintained that it is entitled to contiguity between
and among their settlements. The Palestinian side stated that
Palestinian needs take priority over settlements. The Israeli maps
included plans for future development of Israeli settlements in the
West Bank. The Palestinian side did not agree to the principle of
allowing further development of settlements in the West Bank. Any
growth must occur inside Israel.
The Palestinian side maintained that since Israel has needs in
Palestinian territory, it is responsible for proposing the necessary
border modifications. The Palestinian side reiterated that such
proposals must not adversely affect the Palestinian needs and
interests.
The Israeli side stated that it did not need to maintain settlements in
the Jordan Valley for security purposes, and its proposed maps
reflected this position.
The Israeli maps were principally based on a demographic concept
of settlements blocs that would incorporate approximately 80
percent on the settlers. The Israeli side sketched a map presenting
a 6 percent annexation, the outer limit of the Clinton proposal. The
Palestinian illustrative map presented 3.1 percent in the context of a
land swap.
Both sides accepted the principle of land swap but the
proportionality of the swap remained under discussion. Both sides
agreed that Israeli and Palestinian sovereign areas will have
respective sovereign contiguity. The Israeli side wished to count
"assets" such as Israelis "safe passage/corridor" proposal as being
part of the land swap, even though the proposal would not give
Palestine sovereignty over these "assets". The Israeli side adhered
to a maximum 3 percent land swap as per Clinton proposal.
The Palestinian maps had a similar conceptual point of reference
stressing the importance of a non-annexation of any Palestinian
villages and the contiguity of the West Bank and Jerusalem. They
were predicated on the principle of a land swap that would be
equitable in size and value and in areas adjacent to the border with
Palestine, and in the same vicinity as the annexed by Israel. The
Palestinian side further maintained that land not under Palestinian
sovereignty such as the Israeli proposal regarding a "safe
passage/corridor" as well as economic interests are not included in
the calculation of the swap.
The Palestinian side maintained that the "No-Man's-Land" (Latrun
area) is part of the West Bank. The Israelis did not agree.
The Israeli side requested and additional 2 percent of land under a
lease arrangement to which the Palestinians responded that the
subject of lease can only be discussed after the establishment of a
Palestinian state and the transfer of land to Palestinian sovereignty.
GazaStrip_
Neither side presented any maps over the Gaza Strip. In was implied that the
Gaza Strip will be under total Palestinian sovereignty, but details have still to be
worked out. All settlements will be evacuated. The Palestinian side claimed it
could be arranged in 6 months, a timetable not agreed by the Israeli side.
Safepassage/corridor from Gaza to the West Bank_
Both sides agreed that there is going to be a safe passage from the north of
Gaza (Beit Hanun) to the Hebron district, and that the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip must be territorially linked. The nature of the regime governing the
territorial link and sovereignty over it was not agreed.
Jerusalem
Sovereignty_
Both sides accepted in principle the Clinton suggestion of having a Palestinian
sovereignty over Arab neighborhoods and an Israeli sovereignty over Jewish
neighborhoods. The Palestinian side affirmed that it was ready to discuss Israeli
request to have sovereignty over those Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem
that were constructed after 1967, but not Jebal Abu Ghneim and Ras al-
Amud. The Palestinian side rejected Israeli sovereignty over settlements in the
Jerusalem Metropolitan Area, namely of Ma'ale Adumim and Givat Ze'ev.
The Palestinian side understood that Israel was ready to accept
Palestinian sovereignty over the Arab neighborhoods of East
Jerusalem, including part of Jerusalem's Old City. The Israeli side
understood that the Palestinians were ready to accept Israeli
sovereignty over the Jewish Quarter of the Old City and part of the
Armenian Quarter.
The Palestinian side understood that the Israeli side accepted to
discuss Palestinian property claims in West Jerusalem.
OpenCity_
Both sides favored the idea of an Open City. The Israeli side suggested the
establishment of an open city whose geographical scope encompasses the Old
City of Jerusalem plus an area defined as the Holy Basin or Historical Basin.
The Palestinian side was in favor of an open city provided that
continuity and contiguity were preserved. The Palestinians rejected
the Israeli proposal regarding the geographic scope of an open city
and asserted that the open city is only acceptable if its geographical
scope encompasses the full municipal borders of both East and
West Jerusalem.
The Israeli side raised the idea of establishing a mechanism of daily
coordination and different models were suggested for municipal
coordination and cooperation (dealing with infrastructure, roads,
electricity, sewage, waste removal etc). Such arrangements could
be formulated in a future detailed agreement. It proposed a "soft
border regime" within Jerusalem between Al-Quds and
Yerushalaim that affords them "soft border" privileges. Furthermore
the Israeli side proposed a number of special arrangements for
Palestinian and Israeli residents of the Open City to guarantee that
the Open City arrangement neiadversely affect their daily lives
nor compromise each party sovereignty over its section of the
Open City.
Capitalfor two states_
The Israeli side accepted that the City of Jerusalem would be the capital of the
two states: Yerushalaim, capital of Israel and Al-Quds, capital of the state of
Palestine. The Palestinian side expressed its only concern, namely that East
Jerusalem is the capital of the state of Palestine.
Holy/HistoricalBasin and the Old City_
There was an attempt to develop an alternative concept that would relate to the
Old City and its surroundings, and the Israeli side put forward several
alternative models for discussion, for example, setting up a mechanism for close
coordination and cooperation in the Old City. The idea of a special police
force regime was discussed but not agreed upon.
The Israeli side expressed its interest and raised its concern
regarding the area conceptualized as the Holy Basin (which
includes the Jewish Cemetery on the Mount of Olives, the City of
David and Kivron Valley). The Palestinian side confirmed that it
was willing to take into account Israeli interests and concerns
provided that these places remain under Palestinian sovereignty.
Another option for the Holy Basin, suggested informally by the
Israeli side, was to create a special regime or to suggest some form
of internationalization for the entire area or a joint regime with
special cooperation and coordination. The Palestinian side did not
agree to pursue any of these ideas, although the discussion could
continue.
HolySites: Western Wall and the Wailing Wall_
Both parties have accepted the principle of respective control over each side's
respective holy sites (religious control and management). According to this
principle, Israel's sovereignty over the Western Wall would be recognized
although there remained a dispute regarding the delineation of the area covered
by the Western Wall and especially the link to what is referred to in Clinton's
ideas as the space sacred to Judaism of which it is part.
The Palestinian side acknowledged that Israel has requested to
establish an affiliation to the holy parts of the Western Wall, but
maintained that the question of the Wailing Wall and/or Western
Wall has not been resolved. It maintained the importance of
distinguishing between the Western Wall and the Wailing Wall
segment thereof, recognized in the Islamic faith as the Buraq Wall.
Haramal-Sharif/Temple Mount_
Both sides agreed that the question of Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount has not
been resolved. However, both sides were close to accepting Clinton's ideas
regarding Palestinian sovereignty over Haram al-Sharif notwithstanding
Palestinian and Israeli reservations.
Both sides noted progress on practical arrangements regarding
evacuations, building and public order in the area of the compound.
An informal suggestion was raised that for an agreed period such
as three years, Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount would be under
international sovereignty of the P5 plus Morocco (or other Islamic
presence), whereby the Palestinians would be the
"Guardian/Custodians" during this period. At the end of this period,
either the parties would agree on a new solution or agree to extend
the existing arrangement. In the absence of an agreement, the
parties would return to implement the Clinton formulation. Neither
party accepted or rejected the suggestion.
Refugees_
Non-papers were exchanged, which were regarded as a good basis for the
talks. Both sides stated that the issue of the Palestinian refugees is central
to the Israeli-Palestinian relations and that a comprehensive and just
solution is essential to creating a lasting and morally scrupulous peace. Both
sides agreed to adopt the principles and references with could facilitate the
adoption of an agreement.
Both sides suggested, as a basis, that the parties should agree that a just
settlement of the refugee problem in accordance with the UN Security
Council Resolution 242 must lead to the implementation of UN General
Assembly Resolution 194.
Narrative_
The Israeli side put forward a suggested joint narrative for the tragedy of the
Palestinian refugees. The Palestinian side discussed the proposed narrative and
there was much progress, although no agreement was reached in an attempt to
develop and historical narrative in the general text.
Return,repatriation and relocation and rehabilitation_
Both sides engaged in a discussion of the practicalities of resolving the refugee
issue. The Palestinian side reiterated that the Palestinian refugees should have
the right of return to their homes in accordance with the interpretation of
UNGAR 194. The Israeli side expressed its understanding that the wish to
return as per wording of UNGAR 194 shall be implemented within the
framework of one of the following programs:
A. Return and repatriation to Israel, to Israel swapped territory, to
the Palestine state.
B. Rehabilitation in host country, Relocation to third country.
Preference in all these programs shall be accorded to the
Palestinian refugee population in Lebanon. The Palestinian side
stressed that the above shall be subject to the individual free choice
of the refugees, and shall not prejudice their right to their homes in
accordance with its interpretation of UNGAR 194.
The Israeli side, informally, suggested a three-track 15-year
absorption program, which was discussed but not agreed upon.
The first track referred to the absorption to Israel. No numbers
were agreed upon, but with a non-paper referring to 25,000 in the
first three years of this program (40,000 in the first five years of this
program did not appear in the non-paper but was raised verbally).
The second track referred to the absorption of Palestinian refugees
into the Israeli territory, that shall be transferred to Palestinian
sovereignty, and the third track referring to the absorption of
refugees in the context of family reunification scheme.
The Palestinian side did not present a number, but stated that the
negotiations could not start without an Israeli opening position. It
maintained that Israel's acceptance of the return of refugees should
not prejudice existing programs within Israel such as family
reunification.
Compensation_
Both sides agreed to the establishment of an International Commission and an
International Fund as a mechanism for dealing with compensation in all its
aspects. Both sides agreed that "small-sum" compensation shall be paid to the
refugees in the "fast-track" procedure, claims of compensation for property
losses below certain amount shall be subject to "fast-track" procedures.
There was also progress on Israeli compensation for material
losses, land and assets expropriated, including agreement on a
payment from an Israeli lump sum or proper amount to be agreed
upon that would feed into the International Fund. According to the
Israeli side the calculation of this payment would be based on a
macro-economic survey to evaluate the assets in order to reach a
fair value. The Palestinian side, however, said that this sum would
be calculated on the records of the UNCCP, the Custodian for
Absentee Property and other relevant data with a multiplier to
reach a fair value.
UNRWA_
Both sides agreed that UNRWA should be phased out in accordance with an
agreed timetable of five years, as a targeted period. The Palestinian side added
a possible adjustment of that period to make sure that this will be subject to the
implementation of the other aspects of the agreement dealing with refugees, and
with termination of Palestinian refugee status in the various locations.
FormerJewish refugees_
The Israeli side requested that the issue of compensation to former Jewish
refugees from Arab countries be recognized, while accepting that it was not a
Palestinian responsibility or a bilateral issue. The Palestinian side maintained
that this is not a subject for a bilateral Palestinian-Israeli agreement.
Restitution_
The Palestinian side raised the issue of restitution of refugee property. The
Israeli side rejected this.
Endof claims_
issue of the end of claims was discussed, and it was suggested that the
implementation of the agreement shall constitute a complete and final
implementation of UNGAR 194 and therefore ends all claims.
Security
Earlywarning stations_
The Israeli side requested to have 3 early warning stations on Palestinian
territory. The Palestinian side was prepared to accept the continued operations
of early warning stations but subject to certain conditions. The exact
mechanism has therefore to be detailed in further negotiations.
Militarycapability of the state of Palestine_
The Israeli side maintained that the state of Palestine would be non-militarized
as per the Clinton proposals. The Palestinian side was prepared to accept
limitation on its acquisition of arms, and be defined as a state with limited arms.
The two sides have not yet agreed on the scope of arms limitations, but have
begun exploring different options. Both sides agree that this issue has not been
concluded.
Airspace control_
The two sides recognized that the state of Palestine would have sovereignty
over its airspace. The Israeli side agreed to accept and honor all of Palestine
civil aviation rights according to international regulations, but sought a unified air
control system under overriding Israel control. In addition, Israel requested
access to Palestinian airspace for military operations and training.
The Palestinian side was interested in exploring models for broad
cooperation and coordination in the civil aviation sphere, but
unwilling to cede overriding control to Israel. As for Israeli military
operations and training in Palestinian airspace, the Palestinian side
rejected this request as inconsistent with the neutrality of the state
of Palestine, saying that it cannot grant Israel these privileges while
denying them to its Arab neighbors.
Timetable for withdrawal from the West Bank and Jordan Valley_
Based on the Clinton proposal, the Israeli side agreed to a withdrawal from the
West Bank over a 36-month period with an additional 36 months for the
Jordan Valley in conjunction with an international force, maintaining that a
distinction should be made between withdrawal in the Jordan Valley and
elsewhere.
The Palestinian side rejected a 36-month withdrawal process from
the West Bank expressing concern that a lengthy process would
exacerbate Palestinian-Israeli tensions. The Palestinian side
proposed an 18 months withdrawal under the supervision of
international forces. As to the Jordan Valley the Palestinian side
was prepared to consider the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces
for an additional 10-month period. Although the Palestinian side
was ready to consider the presence of international forces in the
West Bank for a longer period, it refused to accept the ongoing
presence of Israeli forces.
Emergencydeployment (or emergency locations)_
The Israeli side requested to maintain and operate five emergency locations on
Palestinian territory (in the Jordan Valley) with the Palestinian response
allowing for maximum of two emergency locations conditional on a time limit
for the dismantling. In addition, the Palestinian side considered that these two
emergency locations be run by international presence and not by the Israelis.
Informally, the Israeli side expressed willingness to explore ways that a
multinational presence could provide a vehicle for addressing the parties'
respective concerns.
The Palestinian side declined to agree to the deployment of Israeli
armed forces on Palestinian territory during emergency situations,
but was prepared to consider ways in which international forces
might be used in that capacity, particularly within the context of
regional security cooperation efforts.
Securitycooperation and fighting terror_
Both sides were prepared to commit themselves to promoting security
cooperation and fighting terror.
Borders and international crossings_
The Palestinian side was confident that Palestinian sovereignty over
borders and international crossing points would be recognized in
the agreement. The two sides had, however, not yet resolved this
issue including the question of monitoring and verification at
Palestine's international borders (Israeli or international presence).
Electromagneticsphere_
The Israeli side recognized that the state of Palestine would have sovereignty
over the electromagnetic sphere, and acknowledged that it would not seek to
constrain Palestinian commercial use of the sphere, but sought control over it
for security purposes.
The Palestinian side sought full sovereign rights over the
electromagnetic sphere, but was prepared to accommodate
reasonable Israeli needs within a cooperative framework in
accordance with international rules and regulations.